He third meeting of the Cycle of Dialogues organized by NOTICIAS and the Edhasa labelwith the most important Argentine historians and political scientists, this time had as its protagonist Marcos Novaro. The writer spoke with Fernando Fagnani, editor of Edhasaand the talk revolved around the figure of Milei and the last two years in national politics. Precisely, Novaro’s latest book that has just been published is titled “The good, the bad and the ugly. Two years with Milei” and analyzes the president considering some specific milestones of his government, for example, his stabilization program and his possibilities for negotiation with the different social sectors, among other topics.
Always an original reader of current political events, Novaro is a researcher at Conicet and directs the Center for Political Research (Cipol) and the Archive of Oral History of Contemporary Argentina at the Gino Germani Institute. In addition, he is a professor of contemporary Political Theory and the author of several books on key periods in recent history.
Here, the main moments of the talk.
Fernando Fagnani: In “The Good, the Bad and the Ugly” You make a very lucid difference between the country that Milei inherits and the one they inherited Milei’s friends: Orbán, Meloni, Trump and Bolsonaro. This is one reason why these governments cannot be effectively compared. But at the same time, although it is true that they cannot be compared, in all these scenarios it is a bad time for moderates. Because?
Marcos Novaro: There is a relevant factor in all of them and it is discomfort with the political system. It is also a response to the inefficiency of pluralistic systems. Pluralism, in many countries, has become very unlivable. Very blocked political systems, governments that do not produce the changes they promise. So we want a king. To some extent an imperial type is desired to unblock the system. That last aspect is probably the one that is most in tune in Argentina. We have had several weak governments. Cristina’s second government was. Macri’s government even more so and Alberto’s, let’s not talk. The book is about how Milei’s will and such ambitious program are accommodated, with a political system and an amount of resources extremely disproportionate to those ambitions. I would say things could have turned out much worse.
Fagnani: Because?
Novaro: I think that, in the first year, the government did much better than expected. In many ways he was much more pragmatic, reasonable and much more of a negotiator than most expected. Later, success hurt him. The government saw that the economy was recovering and that it had a very large lead in the polls. The opponents did not stop screwing up. Milei had Macri on the brink of retirement. On top of that, all the leaders and votes were “mocking” him. And Peronism insisted on the strategy of failure. They were the best possible opposition for Milei. That is where he began to resurrect his refounding plans and his programmatic voluntarism. He cut ties with Congress, refused to negotiate the budget, insisted with Ariel Lijo. Add to that the fact that it leaves the stocks and the dollar goes to the gang’s floor, more or less. And he wins an election in the City that seemed like he was going to lose. The stage was very lent to turning on the turbines again. And the guy started with everything. But it “crashed.” Nothing too serious happened, but he lost everything this year by hitting the wall. If it doesn’t sink, it seems to me that the rest of the term could look more like the first year than the second. We could have Milei back with restrictions.
Fagnani: This book reminded me of another of yours: “Politics and Power in the Menem government.” It is written in the middle of Menem’s government and is a description that includes the time after publication. You consider how to analyze a political movement beyond what you think of the leader; based on what society expects from that movement. And there is something that seems important to me, in the case of Milei and in that of other presidents, which is conviction. I’m not sure people exactly want a leader or a king, but they do want conviction. And I wonder if Milei, who does not have Menem’s career, can maintain the conviction and ductility that Menem had.
Novaro: With all its flaws, Menem had that capacity for conviction and ductility that you mentioned.. In Milei’s case, she clearly doesn’t. Menem, by preference, went towards negotiation. Milei’s preferences lead him to clash and prefer a heroic defeat to a spurious negotiation. Milei managed to transmit a force of will that he continues to cultivate and remains important for his contract with society. People make fun of the Movistar Arena, but the guy held a ceremony to revalidate that will. The intellectuals are scandalized. Better for him. In that he is a pure populist. In a country like Argentina it is essential, because nobody trusts the institutions. But there is some moderate history that would be good for Milei to learn. At some point, voluntarism leads you to “mess up” and resources are needed that Milei did not build. That also happened to Macri. At some point he needed a broader coalition, but time had consumed him. When he went to look for the Peronists, the only thing he got was Pichetto. That’s the kind of problems that voluntarist presidents face. If Milei wants to survive two more years, she needs the moderates.
Fagnani: How do you see today the possibility that the most important reforms that Milei made will remain?
Novaro: First, the reforms themselves are very few. Milei is much less productive than Menem. He has been able to do virtually nothing in terms of reforms and probably won’t do so for the rest of his term. Above all due to self-management problems. They fail to manage even the basic results of the economy. But it is not tied to a rigid rule and that seems to me to be the most valuable thing about the stabilization scheme. It has a small coalition, which is much more advantageous than having all the trappings of corporations. You don’t have the governors, the unions, the businessmen: the entire Peronist network that is enormously expensive. Milei administers it with very modest pills. When you do it right, it’s economical and it works. When you do it wrong it is dangerous, because the distributive coalition is quickly armed against. This is a much more viable stabilization than the Menemist one, adapted to today’s conditions of extreme scarcity, where you are not going to have a boom. The issue is how small and how petty she is. The administration of that dose to Milei began to fail and she did not notice it. He is also a very small president in that sense.
Fagnani: That would explain the incomprehensibility of the Garrahan, due to the real costs it had for the budget. Retirements are another thing. But it has a very strange relationship with reality.
Novaro: It is a myopia that is quite functional to the problems it has and can solve. With restrictions and in a pragmatic version he can work well for the resources he has. He did not aspire to generate a great government. If he had opted for a grand coalition, I think the failure would have been much more resounding. That was the illusion that Macri was selling him. And that was even worse. Milei understands little, but Macri understands nothing. Thank goodness he didn’t pay attention. Start buying legislators to build a coalition? The same thing that is happening to him now would have happened to him, but with all those people inside the government. It would have been a disaster. What happens is that managing a small coalition that carries out ad hoc negotiations, case by case, has its risk and that risk must be assumed. It seems to me that’s where that failed. The problem was how a series of demands were chained together. He thought he was putting up a dam and it was snowballing. Some things you have to let go and others you have to negotiate.. It seems to me that if Milei has room left in the future, it will probably go in that direction. Pass the budget and maybe some tax reform, I don’t think much more than that. I don’t think the labor or pension reform will pass. I think Milei can moderately right the ship and do things a little better than in the last year. Have a budget, regularize the relationship with the provinces and, perhaps, approve some fiscal reform that gives more consistency to the economic program. The Argentine economy is not going to fly, but the recession may be overcome. In that context, Congress’s siege on the president would be disarmed. Because there is no social support. Because a good part of Peronism doesn’t want to turn it around either. So that? The only one who really needs a breakdown is Cristina. Even Kicillof is more moderate. I don’t think that this situation is so uncomfortable for a small government to emerge from isolation, which is basically the essential thing.
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