It was almost impossible to keep up.
In Ukraine, a hopeful offensive turned into a stalemate. Military forces control the Sahel. Azerbaijan cleared an Armenian enclave. Sudan was torn apart in war.
Wars, conflicts and provocations followed each other in rapid succession in 2023. At times it seemed as if the world had been gripped by a new frenzy, that something that had hitherto been safely contained had been unleashed.
Hamas chose October 7 for a surprise attack from Gaza on Israel. It was a Jewish holiday. The violence was horrific.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government responded with an attack on the narrow strip of land where 2 million civilians are crammed into a trap. He ignored pleas for moderation from almost all over the world for weeks. Bombs weighing 900 kilos were used on residential areas – no ammunition for precision attacks.
On October 7, Hamas took 240 hostages and murdered 1,200 Israelis. The Israeli ground war, according to Hamas, killed 20,000 Palestinians. In an attempt to destroy Hamas, Israel destroys Gaza.
The Gaza war created the risk of a peat fire in the Middle East. The risk that Hezbollah and thus Lebanon, Iran and Syria would enter a regional conflict was suddenly enormous. In the dark tableau of 2023, this is one of the few bright spots: this regional confrontation has – so far – failed to materialize.
Suddenly Europe was in the grip of not one, but two wars. Even after almost two years, many Europeans still show solidarity with Russia-besieged Ukraine, although the growing popularity of the radical right underlines that a minority prefers to give priority to its own needs.
European involvement in Israel has traditionally been layered and fraught. The Jewish state is considered a particularly Western country that happens to be located a bit far to the east. European Muslims feel strong kinship with Palestinians. War there is polarization here.
Shortly after Hamas’s stunning attack, a Brussels diplomat spoke of “geopolitical overload”, the conflicts followed each other so quickly. There was a threat of a shortage of diplomatic ingenuity. To grenades. And perhaps also empathy. Hamas’ attack followed so closely after the fall of the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh that the ethnic cleansing, which had only just been completed, could easily escape your attention.
It wasn’t just diplomats who were taken aback. The Belgian singer Bart Peeters, who writes his own lyrics, said on TV that war had a tendency to creep into all his songs. To keep it manageable, he therefore summarized it in one: Brand new beginnings. “In a dream that mattered, I saw a world without suffering.”
Germany is celebrating the 250th anniversary of the birth of the icon of romanticism, Caspar David Friedrich. A booklet about the painter by writer Florian Illies immediately became a bestseller. Illies suggested that Friedrich is so popular now because his romantic vistas help escape Gaza and Ukraine.
459 armed groups
Was it really worse than other years? Yes. The International Institute for Strategic Studies counted 183 conflicts in the world, according to Bloomberg. The highest number in thirty years. There are almost as many conflicts as there are countries.
In the count, which ran from June 2022 to June 2023, the number of fatalities was 14 percent higher than a year earlier. the number of violent confrontations increased by 28 percent.
The warring parties are often not states, but armed groups such as Hamas, often supported in the background by pariah states such as Russia and Iran. Last year, the Red Cross counted 459 armed groups in the world, which together have approximately 195 million people in their sphere of influence.
Attention to Gaza and Ukraine sometimes threatened to obscure conflicts in other parts of the world. The global one conflict card of the Council on Foreign Relations is an effective remedy against Eurocentric narrowing of view. In the Eastern Hemisphere, a belt of conflict stretches from Africa to the Middle East, via Afghanistan and India/Pakistan to Myanmar, the South China Sea, Taiwan and North Korea.
The International Rescue Committee annually ranks humanitarian crises to determine where most aid should go. Gaza is in second place this year. The Emergency Watchlist is led by Sudan, where 25 million people need assistance. After eight months of fighting between government forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, 6 million people have been displaced.
The increase in the number of conflicts is alarming in itself. But perhaps even more important is that no one seems to be able to get a ‘control’ of it, to use a political buzzword. There appears to be no brake on armed conflict. One of the characteristics of conflicts within states is that they are difficult or impossible to control, writes IISS.
War does not deter. Vladimir Putin has for years seen violence as a tool to achieve political goals without catastrophic consequences for himself or his country. He’s simply gambling on getting away with it.
International consultation also has little effect, certainly not on major confrontations. The superpowers go about their business, no matter what is said in UN meetings. Because Russia has a veto in the Security Council, the highest body for peace and security can mean next to nothing for Ukraine. The West can make a mockery of Russia, but Putin is also immune to public chastisement.
The UN is also powerless in the face of violence in Gaza. Secretary-General António Guterres pulled the emergency brake at his wits’ end. He exercised the right to bring something to the attention of the Security Council himself – a right that is almost never used. It brought no relief to Gazans.
The US is providing ally Israel with extensive backing in its attempt to destroy Hamas. In doing so, Washington is supporting a party that, according to legal experts, is guilty of violating the laws of war and is making itself vulnerable to the accusation of double standards.
In the confrontation with Russia over Ukraine, the US, high on horseback, is the champion of the international legal order. After all, an invasion of a sovereign state that poses no threat is a gross violation of the rules of conduct between states. The US is trying to persuade countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America to explicitly turn against Russia in the Ukraine war. Main argument: if this violation is not punished, it is tantamount to an erosion of the international legal order. Today it is Ukraine’s turn, tomorrow it may be your country. An appeal to the legal order is not strong if you violate it yourself.
Political hawks counter that in the fight for interests and security, a certain degree of hypocrisy is inevitable. Israel’s security, the restoration of deterrence, is simply paramount.
The US therefore blocked a call for a ceasefire in the UN, even though more and more countries supported such a call. In December, 153 countries in the General Assembly urged a ceasefire. Ten countries, including the US and Israel, opposed it. There were 22 abstentions – including the Netherlands. It became increasingly lonely in the UN around Washington – and The Hague.
Stalemate
If 2023 was a bad year, 2024 does not immediately promise to be better. It is currently impossible to predict what the two major confrontations will lead to. Peace talks between Kyiv and Moscow are not on the agenda and no one knows what will become of Gaza.
Ukraine is not only struggling with a stalemate at the front, but also has to work harder and harder for international support. In the US, Republicans are blocking a support package of 60 billion dollars, and in Europe there has been a dispute for weeks with obstructionist Hungary over 50 billion euros in budget support. That money is indispensable for -Kyiv. It will probably be resolved with a delay, but the wrangling shows that after two years it is becoming increasingly difficult to shore up Ukraine.
In the meantime, the debate is once again emerging as to whether Ukraine’s war objective, the reconquest of all occupied territories, including Crimea, which was illegally annexed in 2014, is feasible – no matter how desirable and just that might be. Can Ukraine force a breakthrough if it receives F16 fighter jets and missile systems with a longer range next year? Military officials are already warning that one new weapon system will not… game changer could be.
In conversations about the future of Gaza, faith in the two-state solution is repeatedly expressed, but no one knows how to realize that.
In any case, one political record will be set in 2024: never before were so many people allowed to go to the polls as next year. For just over half of the world’s population, more than 4 billion people The Economist, there are local or national elections. India, Indonesia, Russia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Belgium, European Parliament elections – the list is long. Some elections have far-reaching international consequences.
In January it will be Taiwan’s turn, an election that will determine the difficult relationship with China. The current ruling party emphasizes Taiwanese independence, which is unacceptable to China. The current opposition is committed to a better relationship with Beijing.
The outcome in Taiwan could have an immediate impact on relations between Beijing and Washington. The US finds it unacceptable if Beijing tries to conquer Taiwan.
The two superpowers brought their animosity somewhat under control this year – also one of the few bright spots. Presidents Xi Jinping and Biden agreed that the armed forces will have regular contact with each other again. This helps prevent accidents, for example around Taiwan. There was also room for bilateral agreements on climate. The global climate agreement that was concluded a little later in Dubai was admittedly meager, but it did show that, despite everything, the international community is still capable of a minimum of agreement.
There is one election next year that will dictate whether the world will continue to muddle through, or whether an even more turbulent era will dawn. If Donald Trump becomes president for a second time in November, the question remains what will remain of the international order. Especially if Trump will be more effective in a second chance than in his first term, when he was not well prepared for victory.
American allies, including the Europeans in NATO, will immediately have to ask themselves what the traditional US security guarantees are worth if isolationism returns to the White House with Trump. Given Putin’s war in Ukraine and Chinese assertiveness, the question of whether the US remains a reliable partner is now less open-ended than in 2016.