podcast
The diamond in midfield represents Werder Bremen’s double victory in 2003/04. What is behind this tactic? What part did she play in the triumph? And how would Micoud fan Toni Kroos have functioned in the championship team?
Toni Kroos spent his career at Bayern Munich and Real Madrid. As a child, the Greifswald native was a fan of Werder Bremen. If he could play in a historic team of his choice, he would choose Werder’s double winners from 2004. “I would have seen myself in the team. I would have had a lot of fun there: offensive, spectacle!” In fact: Werder coach Thomas Schaaf’s tactics would have suited Kroos’ strengths perfectly.
The dark time of German football
Review: In 2000, Germany was eliminated from the European Championships in the group phase. While other nations defended with a back four in space, Germany relied on libero and man marking. The motto from Sepp Herberger’s days applied: “The defender pursues his opponent, even if he goes to the toilet!” That was no longer up to date, as the embarrassing exit from the European Championship underlined.
In the following years, football in Germany changed. The Bundesliga clubs implemented game systems that were previously only known from abroad. Thomas Schaaf was one of the pioneers. In 1999 he took over as coach at Werder Bremen. Some time later he switched his team to a back four and zonal coverage.
Advantages and disadvantages of the diamond
Schaaf positioned the midfield staggered: a six-man guarded in front of the four-man chain, a ten-man acted behind two points. The eights worked between sixes and tens. They should help out both defensively and offensively. If you arrange these four players on a tactics board, the shape of a diamond results.
The diamond formation offers various advantages. With four midfielders, the team has a majority in the center when the opponent only has two or three central players. In addition, many triangles can be formed in the center through which the ball can be quickly played forward.
The disadvantage of the formation can be found on the wings: the full-backs have to plow the wings alone. You have to protect both defensively and set the tone offensively.
The diamond becomes the standard
When Werder went on the attack in the 2003/04 season, the back four were already part of the Bundesliga’s inventory. Numerous Bundesliga teams had switched to a 4-4-2. Bayern played a flat 4-4-2 under coach Ottmar Hitzfeld. This means that the midfielders line up next to each other. Other teams like Felix Magath’s Stuttgart played like Werder in a 4-4-2 with a midfield diamond. Werder faced numerous opponents who lined up on the field in exactly the same way as they did.
Then why did Werder dominate the league? No other team’s individual class and tactical formation complemented each other so well. That started in the full-back positions. For many defenders, it was new territory to play an offensive role as a full-back in a back four. Paul Stalteri, Christian Schulz and Ümit Davala found the right balance in this position.
Werder’s master tactics: Frank Baumann, Krisztián Lisztes, Fabian Ernst and Johan Micoud formed the midfield diamond, Paul Stalteri and Christian Schulz worked the wings.
The outside players always received support from the eights. No matter whether Fabian Ernst, Krisztian Lisztes or Tim Borowski played there: they all impressed with their great enthusiasm for running. They supported the full-backs and their midfield colleagues.
Faster than the rest
The midfield was the heart of Bremen. Ten-man Johan Micoud was at his peak in the championship season: he filleted opposing defenses with precise passes. “Of course they tried to cover Jo Micoud,” recalls coach Schaaf in the Sportschau podcast. “But that wasn’t enough because the system was so well coordinated and Jo was so clever that he escaped his position and free spaces emerged.”
That was great, it was so skillful and so harmonious that they made life difficult for every opponent.
Accordingly, the Bremen diamond itself was less the secret of success. It was the way they interpreted the formation. This becomes clearest when looking at the attack.
Werder were by no means a ball possession team during the season. Her great strength was her high speed. Ailton was nicknamed “Ball Lightning” for a reason. He was lurking on the edge to the offside for passes deep. After winning the ball, Werder played two or three short passes in the center and then immediately looked for the deep pass. Werder relied primarily on flat passes; Ailton and his strike partner Ivan Klasnic were able to exploit these.
The perfect team for Toni Kroos
The fast vertical game gave Werder an advantage against almost every opponent. If the opposing team defended with a libero, Werder could play the opponent apart by being overweight in the midfield. If they met an opponent who also played in a diamond formation, they won the games through their individual superiority. They could simply pass the ball more accurately and quickly than any other Bundesliga team.
Fast, fluid passing game? That sounds exactly like the kind of football that Toni Kroos loves. Accordingly, he emphasizes that there is only one Werder team in which he would have liked to have played: the one in 2004, alongside Micoud and Baumann and Ailton.
Tobias Escher is a sports journalist, author and tactics expert. He is co-founder of the tactics blog “spielverlager.de”.