“It’s difficult and painful,” Lauren Gould said by phone from Iraq about her visit to the city of Hawija on Sunday. “You feel the frustration here much worse than behind your desk in the Netherlands.”
Early this week, the specialist in research into remote warfare at Utrecht University, together with peace organization Pax and the Iraqi aid organization Al Ghad, presented the findings of a year-long study into the consequences of the attack by Dutch F-16s in June 2015 at an IS weapons depot. A large part of the (inhabited) environment was wiped out by the detonation of 18,000 kilos of stored explosives.
“People in Hawija appear to be disappointed in the Netherlands,” says Gould. “From a country with precision weapons, a country of international law moreover, they had not expected such a thing at all.”
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Omar’s face burned as a result of the attack.
Photo Ayman al-Amiri/PAX
The damage and the number of dead and injured are significantly greater than reported by the international coalition against IS, according to the investigation published Friday under the name After the Strike. Not 70 dead as the US stated, which this newspaper also assumed in its reporting, but at least 85. Not a hundred injured, but rather five hundred. Not seven hundred buildings destroyed or damaged but an estimated six thousand.
Former minister Ank Bijleveld (Defence, CDA) said in 2020 that it was not possible to determine the exact consequences for the civilian population years after the attack. The area was unsafe for a long time. The dead are buried, the city administration is flawed. This is one of the reasons why the Netherlands has not yet conducted any research in Hawija itself.
Also read this story by lawyer Liesbeth Zegveld on behalf of eleven victims: ‘Unacceptable risk’ taken with attack on Hawija
Research into the impact on the city and its residents is indeed possible, the Utrecht researchers and Pax wanted to show. Conversations with victims and key figures such as aid workers and administrators, documentation from authorities and citizens, new satellite images; they provide insight into the aftermath of a major event that kept Defense silent from June 2015 to the end of 2019.
The conversations with victims were conducted by people from Hawija itself. Could they be critical of the stories of residents and administrators of an area where there was a lot of support for IS?
“You need people who know the fairly closed community of Hawija and who speak the dialect. In preparation for the discussions, we provided training to make them aware of the limitations of their own perspective. We also gave them a questionnaire as a manual. Furthermore, the still visible massive damage in Hawija speaks for itself; he doesn’t lie. If you then look for additional material, you can go far. We do not pretend to have mapped out all victims and damage.”
How do you explain the huge difference in estimating property damage: 6,000 destroyed and damaged buildings versus 700 in the US at the time?
“This latest estimate was based on satellite imagery. These have limitations, for example due to the angle from which the images were taken at a great height. Our figure comes from ground estimates by administrators who know the affected neighborhoods well. They counted the completely destroyed houses, but also the buildings where only the windows or doors had been destroyed.”
You make recommendations, such as no more attacking bomb depots near residential areas. Do you not place yourself outside the military reality?
“Not at all. On the contrary, we make concrete proposals to think along with defence. How can the armed forces achieve their strategic goals without risking civilian attacks? To this end, we propose the creation of an independent unit of military personnel and experts who have earned their spurs in the investigation of civilian deaths. When planning risky attacks, especially in urban areas, that unit can advise alternatives.”
You also want to improve the information position of the Red Card Holder, the soldier who has to give the green light for an attack by F16s. Is that possible? The Red Card Holder relies on information from allies.
„By reporting from NRC we know that the Red Card Holder was not informed of the doubts of American planners about the attack on Hawija. That is why we propose that when participating in international coalitions, the Netherlands makes solid agreements about how our military personnel can be involved earlier and better in the intelligence process.”
Also read: Many sources for Hawija research, but they are flawed
A version of this article also appeared in NRC on the morning of April 8, 2022