More than sixty years after Tintin in Tibet was there now then Scholz in China. It was diplomatic bumbling. Not that he went, but how (Volkswagen, olé!), with whom (without Macron, who had suggested a joint journey) and when – before the G20 summit and just after Xi was crowned emperor.
In the run-up, Scholz managed to snub all his allies, and his own coalition. Foreign Minister Baerbock subtly reminded us why Berlin is working on a new China strategy. ‘The Chinese political system has changed radically – and that is why our China policy must also change.’ It’s an epic battle, how Germany (or rather: the SPD) struggles with the new world in which your commercial urges and world peace are not automatically in line with each other.
dip
That other EU leader, Emmanuel Macron, is also in a strategic dip. It is not NATO that appears to be brain dead, but its role de médiateur regarding Russia. Macron wanted to become Europe’s leader after Merkel, but noticed that the Franco-German locomotive was being disconnected from world politics (even before Scholz fled on a German diesel). Russia made its demands to the US and NATO before February 24 – and after the invasion, the US, UK, Poland and the Balts took the lead.
In an opinion piece in Le Monde French academics note with horror that France has lost its leadership role. They argue for a ‘radical turnaround’. Paris must become a major pillar of Kyiv, give up the aspiration to be a “balance force” with Russia and move closer to the Central European countries.
In this way the war throws everything upside down, including the expectations of the world in The Hague. Here people had just converted to what is now in tatters: European strategic autonomy and Franco-German leadership. And that hurts. This summer I heard a news hourpresenter and an expert – two exponents of the rational, right-thinking branch of the European tribe – found, somewhat haunted, that ’emotion’ had led Ukraine to become a candidate for EU membership.
mental map
Sometimes it seems that whoever tries to understand Europe from the Netherlands, already in advance
1-0 behind. Since the upheaval of 1989/’91 we have struggled to adapt our ‘mental map’ of Europe to developments on the continent. But let’s turn it around: who knows, later historians may conclude that the shock of the war, the ’emotional’ confrontation with a long-standing reality, helped ‘Europe’ to make the right decision. And also to find the stability towards Putin’s Russia that for years was completely out of reach in Western European capitals.
The war also clarifies what is wrong with strategically autonomous Europe: it does not exist. There is, however, the laudable aim of making Europe more resilient, which is possible in decades with hard work, unity and a lot of money. A few days before the February 24 invasion, I wrote: ‘Some strategists think that if America runs away from Europe you will have a militarily powerful Europe. gets. But the required lead time is far too long. So you get a Europe under Russian influence. But that violates an American red line, so they don’t go away (fingers crossed)’.
Like Philip Roth in The Plot Against America fantasized about what would have happened if Lindbergh had won the 1940 election, now you may wonder: What if Trump had defeated Biden and not helped Ukraine? Had Kyiv been overrun after European arms support dried up? Would Macron and Scholz fly back and forth to Moscow to negotiate a humiliating ‘Minsk-III’ with Tsar Vladimir over a dismantled rump Ukraine (capital Lviv)? Peace for our time?
western aid
After eight months of war, Ukraine is still holding out, also thanks to Western aid. But in the long run, the unanimity is put to the test. The energy quarrels within the EU are a harbinger of this. However, Berlin and Paris are by no means the only concern. In Foreign Affairs is looking for the American analyst Richard Haass puts the biggest threat to his country at home. “A country divided against itself cannot act effectively in the world.” But in Europe there is now no alternative to American leadership. Thirty years after the Cold War, that is not a comforting thought about the geopolitical learning capacity on this continent.
Arnout Brouwers is a historian and editor of de Volkskrant. He writes a change column with Arie Elshout every other week.