‘Several missiles explode at the same time. The earth seems to swell. Shrapnel fill the air. The sudden shock wave hits your ears hard and your eyes feel heavy. Your internal organs begin to vibrate. Outside the safety of a shelter, chaos is pure hell. I am not exaggerating. The sky becomes hidden behind smoke and ash. Tongues of fire lick the still standing walls of destroyed houses. The fire burns the ground and grass. I turn and twist my body into fetal position and count the explosions. One, two, three…Forty. That’s how many missiles a Grad system can fire in one salvo.’
So describes Myroslav Otkovych, a Ukrainian soldier, what has been happening in recent days at the front near Bachmoet, the place where Ukrainian troops have been under heavy fire for weeks, months – and where Wagner troops, on Vladimir Putin’s 70th birthday, are trying to break through to force.
It cannot be said often enough: wars are not linear, which makes their course unpredictable. But there are constants, even in this war. And they help explain how Ukraine was able to achieve such massive successes on the battlefield in recent days and weeks.
Over the past week, Russian troops have been knocked down on two fronts at once. After the capture of Lyman, Ukrainians advanced further north towards Kreminna and Svatove. Also spectacular was the rapid territorial gains, after a weeks-long run, on the southern front where Ukrainians advanced from two directions towards two strategically crucial crossing points across the Dnipro, Nova Kakhovka and Kherson.
How so much territory could be recaptured in the past month – apart from the flaws of the Russian war machine – is due to a combination of several factors: motivation, (Western) weapons, (American) strategic intelligence, modern lines of command, integrated action. And smart planning.
Behind the front
There seems to be increasingly close cooperation between Ukraine and its western partners, especially the US. And with Ukrainian weapons and supplies running out, the war effort behind the front (weapons, equipment, maintenance, ammunition, repair, training) is increasingly being borne by the US and European countries.
US real-time information (from satellite images) about the position of Russian troops, storage depots, command centers and the like helped Kyiv this summer to prepare the ground for the offensives with Himar missile systems from the US. The logistical supply lines of the Russians were destroyed or disrupted. In addition, an initial plan for a frontal attack in the south, fearing huge numbers of casualties, would have changed into the approach with two offensives. That worked out well.
This week’s gains on the southern front bring the siege of the two crucial places on the Dnipro closer: first Nova Kachovka, then Kherson. The latter place is located at the mouth of the Dnipro, is the key to the Crimea, and base towards Odesa. It’s the main “prize” Ukraine hopes to recapture before winter finally hits, but thousands of well-equipped Russian troops have gathered. Their logistical situation is precarious, because the bridges over the Dnipro are frequently bombarded, but president Putin himself would have prevented withdrawal from the city, according to American media.
The frontline also offers opportunities for the Ukrainians in the north. If they succeed in retaking Kreminna and Svatove, Severodonetsk and Lysityansk will be in their sights – the cities Russia took so hard to conquer this summer. If, on the other hand, the Russians must conquer Bach, this is a morale boost for Moscow, but initially the Russians wanted to clamp the cities of Kramatorsk and Slovyansk in a scissors’ movement with Bachmoet. That is no longer possible after the recent Ukrainian territorial gains.
The timing of this offensive reinforces the impression that it is also an expression of the internal power struggle in Russia. Wagner boss Prigozhin – who is ambitious and very critical of the Russian army – wants to show that Russians can indeed fight, as long as they are ‘his’ Russians.
Reformed Army
Two important elements are still missing to explain the recent Ukrainian successes. First, the lack of Russian air dominance. Russia does deploy its Migs, but in such a way (they fire non-precision ammunition from a distance) that they are not very effective.
At least as important is the tactical superiority of the Ukrainians. While the Russian army has remained stuck in rigid lines of command, contempt for the soldier and corruption, the Ukrainian army has been reformed in a western direction: trained in integrated operations, with good internal lines of communication, respect for the military, and more room for acting according to the needs of the people. business lower down the command line.
In short, the Ukrainians operate smarter. They operate forward in small groups, have good tactical reconnaissance, and try not to attack large troop concentrations and cities head on, but to bypass and then take hold of them. But they still face the formidable firepower of the Russians, soon supplemented by tens of thousands of fresh (albeit ill-motivated and barely trained) recruits.
Western experts believe that even with mobilization, Russia cannot improve its deplorable performance on the battlefield much. Nevertheless, President Putin was finally able to smile again, when he stood hustling in his Kremlin palace last week, his hands entwined with those of four front men from the ‘new provinces’. ‘Russia! Russia!’ they shouted. The reality on the battlefield is, as it turns out this week, more unruly.
