The breakup by Algeria of the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborhood signed with Spain in 2002, and the immediate suspension by the Algerian bank of direct debits for foreign trade operations, which in practice freezes the import and export of products between Spain and Algeria, open a string of unknowns about the real impact that such measures may have on gas supply and on the future of all Spanish companies with economic interests in the North African country. Although the foreign minister, Jose Manuel Albaresclaims to have received guarantees at the highest level from the Algerian Government about the maintenance of supply, the urgent efforts to obtain the support of the European Union and that the minister has advanced the need to give a “calm, but firm” response make it clear that the tension between Madrid and Algiers is indisputable and that difficult days can be foreseen.
Spain gave a radical turn in relation to Western Sahara to support the autonomous solution sponsored by Morocco, both as an exercise in realism when it comes to finding a viable solution to the situation of the Saharawi people and with the aim of obtaining tangible benefits in the form of alleviating the permanent pressure of the Moroccan neighborhood on Ceuta and Melilla. A strategic move that would have been unthinkable in recent decades, not only because of the weight of Spain’s historical debt with the Saharawis, but also because of the traditional balance of forces, influences and interests in the area of the Strait. Nevertheless, the geostrategic reality has changed: both the commitment of the United States to the stability of the region and, as a result of the war in Ukraine, the international gas market and Russia’s ability to act as a support for the Algerian regime.
Just as Spain’s foreign policy has been redefined in the face of this new reality, Algeria has also reacted by tightening the rope in its trade relationship with Spain and reaching out to Italy as a new preferred partner in gas supply. The risks are not minor, starting with the threat of cracking the Iberian exceptionality recently approved by the European Union, since it depends on Algerian gas -25% of Spanish consumption- flowing without interruptions or setbacks and its effects can be relativized with a hypothetical increase in the price paid by Spain for imported gas. And following the fact that Algeria is a fundamental actor in Spanish security policy (counterterrorist cooperation) and in the management of migratory flows originating from the Algerian coast.
But it is no less true that the Algerian government’s room for maneuver, with a population hit by the economic crisis and rampant corruption, is very relative. That giving up its export agreements with Spain is an unimaginable scenario. And that its challenge, especially the obstacles to trade with Spain, involve the whole of the European Unionwhile they question the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement in force since 2005 and that the change in approach to Spain’s relationship with Morocco is not at all unrelated to European foreign policy as a whole.
In this sense, the support expressed by the main spokesman of the European Commission, Eric Mamer, urging Algiers to “reverse” a decision that he has described as “extremely worrying” is significant. The resolution of the conflict will be bilateral, but an even more explicit message from the EU would still be necessary (and the meeting scheduled for this Friday between Albares and the EU’s trade policy commissioner, Valdis Dombrovskis, would be the moment to make it evident ).