According to the investigation into decolonization, it appears that “the vast majority of those responsible on the Dutch side – politicians, officers, civil servants, judges and other involved parties – did have or could have had knowledge of the systematic use of extreme violence, but were jointly prepared to tolerate it, justify it, disguise it and leave it unpunished.”
All this served a higher purpose “to win the war against the Republic of Indonesia and to direct the process of decolonization ourselves.” There was a willingness at all levels to set aside the written and unwritten rules of law and one’s own sense of justice, say the scientists of the study Independence, Decolonization, Violence and War in Indonesia, 1945-1950.
“The Dutch underestimation and rejection of the widely supported Indonesian independence movement was based on a deeply rooted colonial mentality,” they note. “Politicians, soldiers and administrators in the colony and in the Netherlands were convinced of the Dutch superiority and in their pursuit of control of Indonesia were mainly guided by economic and geopolitical motives and the idea of still having a mission in the ‘East’ and there to be indispensable.”
This led to crucial errors of judgment, both militarily and politically. The Netherlands also became highly isolated internationally.
The eventual formal transfer of sovereignty (on December 27, 1949) resulted from “strong pressure from the international community and the realization that the war could not be won”.