When he died in July 1974, Juan Domingo Perón left his many dependents what was left of the immense political fortune he had amassed decades earlier. To the disappointment of those convinced that the authoritarian movement he founded would accompany him into the afterlife, his heirs received enough to allow them to dominate the national stage for half a century more, but there are signs that Peronism’s long reign may be drawing to a close. . In addition to facing the real possibility that their eventual presidential candidate, be it Sergio Massa, Daniel Scioli, or some genuinely Kirchnerist “covert,” come third in the upcoming elections, it has become painfully evident that the ideas and attitudes that are characteristic of Peronism have ruined a country that, well governed, could have been among the most prosperous and creative on the planet.
Even so, there are doubts. Since the middle of the last century, thousands of obituaries have been written for the movement that, according to the most critical, was only a South American imitation of Italian fascism whose success was made possible by the temporary advantages that neutral Argentina enjoyed during World War II.
All the funeral news turned out to be premature. Until yesterday, Peronism or, if one prefers, the Peronist mentality, continued to predominate in the political and even intellectual world of the country despite having led an improbable series of collective disasters. It is therefore understandable that many are reacting with disbelief to what is happening.
The Peronist mentality is resolutely negative. Selfishness aside, the only thing that Cristina, Alberto, Sergio and their collaborators had in common when they formed the current government was the will to prevent Mauricio Macri, that is, “the right”, from retaining power. Since they never bothered to think of a positive government program, something that Máximo Kirchner has just requested, somewhat belatedly, it did not occur to them that, unless they made a genuine effort to mitigate the country’s problems, they would run the risk of provoking a catastrophe of historic dimensions.
At the beginning of what in theory would be his own management but which, to the surprise of few, would turn out to be a drill, Alberto declared himself against the economic plans. He did so with the ostensible purpose of assuring readers of the highly influential London Financial Times that he was not a dogmatic leftist, but most took it as evidence that he feared committing himself to unsympathetic measures of the kind that were clearly necessary under the circumstances. and that, after the pandemic and the outbreak of a war in Europe, they would become essential. In all democratic countries, today to govern is to adjust and those who resist doing so “on principle” often fall victim to the inflationary crises that they unleash themselves.
It is what has happened here. From the outset, it was predictable that a government armed by a woman accused of a multitude of crimes would fail, whose absolute priority was to tear apart the judicial system, one that would be formally headed by a lightweight who until then had criticized her with extreme virulence. and that he would be supported by an almost comically ambitious slippery pragmatist.
Although Cristina still has a significant number of votes, not enough to win a presidential election, Alberto lacked the self-confidence, personal authority and cunning that would have allowed him to establish himself as a true leader with good reason to wait to be re-elected and Sergio, who despite everything is still standing, has turned out to be unable to stop the inflationary tsunami that, day after day, gains more destructive force. To prevail electorally, the Tigrense would have no choice but to intimidate the people by telling them how terrible a government of Together for Change or La Libertad Avanza would be for them, but he knows that it would be highly unlikely that such a campaign would work. .
For the pro-government trio, the big question is: will everything collapse before the PASO that is scheduled for August 13, or after? In the past week, fears that the outbreak was imminent intensified. Indeed, everything suggests that the markets are preparing to take revenge on those politicians who despise them by mounting a massive offensive against the meager national peso. Would a formal devaluation serve to appease those who operate in the exchange market? Virtually no one believes it, but as it is, there aren’t many alternatives.
As was the case after the replacement of Martín Guzmán by Silvina Batakis, some say that in the Casa Rosada the sound of helicopters revving up their engines can be heard. They like to imagine that Massa, fed up with trying to square the circle by managing an economy that seems to be dying without taking measures that would anger Cristina and the Kirchner militancy, decides to leave, and that Alberto and other officials feel obliged to emulate him after acknowledging that they do not have the slightest idea of how to prevent everything from falling apart. Although resigning out of awareness of one’s own limitations would be worthy of being described as patriotic, the possibility of something like this happening is, unfortunately, very slim.
Thanks to the disturbing presence of Javier Milei, a character who has lately been transformed from a picturesque eccentric, someone more notable for his hair than for his political promises, into a presidential candidate who must be taken very seriously, many specialists in matter have started to warn us that the dollarization that he proposes would be impossible in a country with very few dollars in the coffers and that trying it before they are full would have catastrophic consequences.
While even the destitute have become accustomed to thinking in dollars, to have the long-term consequences envisioned by its supporters, dollarization would have to coincide with profound cultural change. As convertibility reminded us, living with a strong currency is extremely difficult for a society whose political leaders pretend to believe that fiscal rigor is a far-right crime against humanity. Likewise, since it is to be assumed that the immediate socioeconomic costs of dollarization would be more or less equal to those of an all-out defense of the value of the peso, it would be more logical to opt for this variant, although, of course, any government that tried it could unleash the much feared social outbreak. After all, had it not been for the almost universal conviction that the majority here would not be willing to put up with a degree of fiscal discipline that in other latitudes would be considered normal, Argentina would never have reached its current traumatic situation.
Although it is fashionable to compare Milei with other notorious outsiders such as the American Donald Trump and the Brazilian Jair Bolsonaro, there are many differences. Milei is presented as an antidote to wasteful populism. She prides herself on being a champion of the pure and simple liberalism of the Austrian School, a creed that the presumed precursors of her have never dreamed of claiming, if they have even heard of it. Even so, like them, Milei implies that, once enthroned, he will clean up the dirt that a parasitic and corrupt “caste” has left behind so that his country can recover in a short time the place that, he says, it deserves to occupy in the international scheme.
It is a voluntaristic message, not to say messianic, which, needless to say, overlooks a number of practical difficulties. To implement the program he has in mind, Milei would have to break with the existing democratic order in which, scandalous as it may seem to him, Congress plays a key role, and then rule as an omnipotent dictator; he says he would do it by holding referendums, as the Swiss do, but organizing them would not be as easy as he seems to think. In any case, his would be a very unique dictatorship, one led by a character who would not exalt order, as traditional strongmen do, but a personal version of chaos, although presumably, in the event that, To the global alarm, if she were to win the elections, Milei would understand that in order to govern she would need the collaboration of those members of the hated “caste” who to some extent share her liberal principles.
Needless to say, the mere possibility that Alberto’s successor will be Milei tells us a lot about the tremendous failure of not only the most recent Peronist government but also the shortcomings of a shaky opposition coalition that, in the opinion of many, would not be in a position to repair the damage that Cristina and her faithful have done. If Milei represents something, it is not the popular enthusiasm for an Austrian economic recipe book but the visceral hostility towards the political class, if not towards politics as such, shared by millions of citizens who feel cheated by those who promised to defend their interests but that, in many cases, have not hesitated to give priority to their own, be they personal or corporate.
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