The strategic cooperation between Moscow and Beijing has been strongly intensified in recent years, partly due to corona. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is therefore also a test of this cooperation. The global balance of power in which the US is still dominant is at a turning point: the transformation to a multipolar order. The international legal order based on liberal values and with democracy as the dominant model is under high tension. Both Russia and China are to blame for this.
friends
At the opening of the Olympics, Russia and China announced that they would establish a new world order with ‘true democracy’, based on the ‘borderless friendship’ between the two countries. Beijing asked the Russian leadership to wait a little longer with actions in Ukraine until after the Olympics, you do that for your friends. But China seems to be in a split over Putin’s invasion of Ukraine: Beijing may not have counted on a ‘full scale war†
The way Beijing tries to reconcile its foreign policy dogma of “respect for territorial integrity, sovereignty and non-intervention in internal affairs” with the Russian attack on Ukraine – a country that sees Beijing not only as a sovereign nation, but also as a promising market for trade and investment – indicates this.
The Chinese government has so far reacted with restraint to the invasion of Ukraine and abstained from voting – or thus did not support Russia – in the UN Security Council, just as it did with the invasion of Crimea in 2014. China is torn between (ideological and practical) support for Russia, its non-intervention principles, and the economic interests in the region and the stability required for this. In addition, it does not want to further deteriorate its relationship with the US and Europe.
Corona collaboration
Strategic cooperation between China and Russia has intensified during the coronavirus pandemic, when China embarked on a global campaign to draw the narrative on (the origins of) COVID-19 through intense censorship, intimidation and disinformation campaigns. China has learned from Russia and adopted Russian tactics. Russia, in turn, supported China in the battle over the corona narrative, and both accused the West of politicking vaccine production and distribution.
The two even teamed up in spreading fake news: China took over Russian reports that there would be 20 US biological labs in Ukraine where the virus was produced. This at least presupposes a shared agenda in sharing disinformation to weaken the West, and specifically to discredit America.
China has expanded its influence in Ukraine in recent years. Kyiv and Beijing have been strategic partners since 2011; they signed a collaboration agreement for infrastructure development in 2021. Since the 2014 Russia-Ukraine war, Putin has seen China’s role in Ukraine through the prism of his confrontation with the West. China’s influence in Ukraine should undermine Kyiv’s partnership with the West and the path to European integration.
Chinese interest
In turn, China is interested in Ukraine because of its broader global ambitions: conquering new markets, acquiring new (defense) technologies (in Ukraine especially: space and missile technology), and striving to replace the US as number one in the world. The import of grain was also important for China and Ukraine played an important role as a gateway to European markets as a junction in the New Silk Road (Belt and Road Initiative), although the occupation of Crimea in 2014 has already made that somewhat more difficult.
However, the ‘Russia factor’ – the former Soviet republics and the Russian sphere of influence, which also plays a major role in other Eastern European and Central Asian countries – undermines China’s influence and (economic) ambitions in the region. So China is simultaneously trying to distance itself somewhat from Moscow, as far as possible, to walk its own path. China’s refusal to recognize Russia’s claim to Crimea and Beijing’s support for Ukrainian territorial integrity and sovereignty – as enshrined in the China-Ukraine Partnership Agreement (2011) – should be viewed in this context.
balancing act
China’s behavior is illustrative of the balancing act between Moscow, Washington, Kyiv and Brussels. Ideologically, Russia and China share the broader goals of subverting American influence in what they see as their regions of influence, subverting the international legal order based on liberal values, and promoting autocratic practices and the autocracy as an (alternative) model of governance.
And the authoritarian tide has not turned yet, Freedom House reports year after year. Ukraine is a test for the ‘marriage of conveniencebetween Russia and China. They are not really loyal allies, there is historically too much mistrust and the interests are too different. As a Chinese expression says: ‘They lie in the same bed, but have different dreams’.
The big difference between Russia and China is that Putin is mainly focused on creating instability in different regions and undermining the transatlantic ambitions of countries in the Russian sphere of influence, where China prefers stability and strengthening ties to economic ambitions and political influence. Moreover, Beijing does not attack (at least not openly) the transatlantic or European ambitions of partner countries.
On the contrary, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has united the West, not only in imposing heavy sanctions and increasing defense budgets, but also as a community of values – the last thing China wanted. Against the background of the gigantic human drama that is now unfolding in Ukraine, the global rivalry between the autocratic and democratic models and associated values and rules of conduct is thus raging.
How the strategic cooperation between Russia and China will develop in the coming period will determine this. †The million dollar question‘ is when the dreams of Beijing and Moscow start to diverge to such an extent that their mutual strategic cooperation is weakened. The West would do well to respond to this.
Susanne Kamerling is an associate fellow at the Institute for Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) of Leiden University and works as a senior researcher/advisor on a project basis for the European External Action Service (EEAS), EU Delegation in China and European Commission on issues related to security and Asia. This opinion contribution is in a personal capacity.