Merkel’s silence on the invasion of Ukraine highlights her mistakes with Russia

“This war of aggression Germany marks a profound before and after in the history of Europe after the end of the Cold War. There is no justification for this flagrant violation of international law. I condemn it most emphatically.” These have so far been the only words of Angela Merkel about the Russian invasion of Ukraine. He released them from the former foreign minister’s office on February 24, the same day the Russian Army crossed the Ukrainian borders. More than a month later, the most important German political figure of the 21st century – a profound connoisseur of Vladimir Putinwith whom he shared numerous negotiations and summits – continues to avoid appearances or public statements.

Analysts stress that Merkel wants to avoid at all costs removing the role of the social democrat Olaf Scholz, his successor at the head of the chancellery. There are also those who see in that thunderous silence an implicit acknowledgment of two strategic mistakes that, with hindsight, marked the 16 years of Merkel’s governments: the insistence on recognizing Putin as a interlocutor predictable and relatively reliable head of the Kremlin, and the momentum of a energy dependency on russian gas to which Germany has no alternative in the short term. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which directly connects Russia with the northeast of Germany, is the clearest example: Merkel defended it until the end of her government, arguing that it was a “private initiative”.

Voices in the CDU

“I cannot and do not want to say anything about Mrs. Merkel. But, looking back, many decisions were wrong. For example, having deepened energy dependence on Russia, having ensured for years that the gas pipeline North Stream 2 it was a private initiative project, even though it never was. The rest should be asked of Mrs. Merkel. I cannot speak for her.” This was said this week by Friedrich Merz, the new president of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU), during a video conference with foreign journalists.

Merz, a historical rival of Merkel within German conservatism, did not miss the opportunity to shoot at part of the former chancellor’s legacy. The voices critical of Merkel within the conservative party are not limited, however, to sectors historically opposed to the merkelism. Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauerformer president of the CDU, former federal defense minister and figure close to Merkel, wrote on February 24 on Twitter: “I am furious with us because we failed historically. We did not prepare after what happened in Georgia, crimea and the donbaswhich would have scared Putin.” The majestic plural used by Kramp-Karrenbauer goes beyond simple self-criticism and takes aim at Merkel without citing her.

the fossil card

The figures on Germany’s energy dependence on Russia speak for themselves: around 75% of Russian imports to the Federal Republic are mineral fuels (gas, oil, coal, etc.). These imports also cover more than half of the consumption of the Federal Republic, as pointed out by a report by the Institute for German Economics (IWK).

According to figures from the Federal Statistical Office (Destatis), in 2005 – the year Merkel came to power – Germany imported Russian gas and oil worth 16,000 million euros. Last year, that figure topped 19 billion. Germany is, with almost 25% of total Russian gas imports, the biggest customer of Russia in the world. With the start-up of the Nord Stream 2 – paralyzed sine die-, that energy dependency would increase even more.

Putin’s fossil card is therefore evident in the global crisis unleashed by the invasion and consequent war in Ukraine. The question that remains in the air is why Merkel – a politician who found it difficult to make quick decisions because she preferred to analyze all the variables beforehand – delved so deeply and for so long into Germany’s energy dependence on Russia.

“In recent years, the number one priority in German energy policy has been good prices. And when it came to buying gas, Russia was the closest supplier. In recent years, gas distributed through gas pipelines has been clearly cheaper than liquefied gas,” Malte Küper, a specialist in energy policy at the IWK, responds to EL PERIÓDICO. “The current conflict highlights the weakness derived from this dependence, despite the fact that it is reciprocal: Russia also depends on export earnings Of gas”.

possible collapse

Merkel’s Germany opted for Russian gas with the support of an industry that saw low prices and Russia’s reliability as a supplier as a good option to maintain competitiveness. From the geostrategic point of view, the successive governments of Merkel seemed to bet on the business ties with Moscow to reduce the growing military tensions between NATO and the Russian Federation -a strategy already used by the Federal Republic with the Soviet Union in the final phase of the Cold War-.

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All of that is now displayed as a strategic mistake. In the short term, Germany cannot replace Russian gas. Scholz’s tripartite government is therefore opposed to blocking fossil imports from Russia with which Putin is financing the invasion of Ukraine. “If Germany wants to replace Russian gas, then we will have to buy liquefied gas in large quantities, for example, from Taste or United States. However, up to now Germany does not have any processing plant,” says Malte Küper, who establishes a period of at least two years to be able to replace Russian gas with liquefied gas.

With this scenario, it is not unreasonable that Germany faces next winter with some insufficient reserves of gas, which could mean a collapse of its industrial system -whose operation depends largely on Russian gas- and a direct impact on the supply chains of supermarkets and stores, with the corresponding shortage. The famous “collapse”, so announced by energy experts for decades, would thus be closer.



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