The result of the Brazilian elections proved that there was no massive migration of votes from the poorest to Lula Da Silva. The PT leader and his campaign team worked on the nostalgic appeal to what had been the social policies in his first two terms (2003-2010), in which Brazil experienced extraordinary economic growth combined with successful measures of income distribution.
But before those messages the electorate was divided. Lula da Silva’s second term had ended with a approval of 80 percent and GDP growth of 7.5%. Few see that scenario as possible today. The re-elected former president only generated strong support among Brazilians who are on the verge of destitution, and who have traditionally been the beneficiaries of his flagship social program, the Bolsa Familia, which distributed cash transfers, social plans that also run locally .
The elections show while Jair Bolsonaro leaned on the lower middle classthe one who views Da Silva’s social policies with suspicion towards his own voters, a scenario similar to that experienced by Alberto Fernández and the Frente de Todos in Argentina. The line between the two groups is blurred, Brazilian political analysts warn, but the tension between the two factions over income and economic opportunitiessomething that also happens locally, seems to offer a better explanation of the Brazilian electoral results last weekend.
Therefore, the campaign rhetoric adopted by Lula in the last stretch, it was quite different from the previous elections, when he openly clashed with the elites. This time the PT candidate presented himself as the system’s candidate, like a “Brazilian Joe Biden”, ending a Trump interlude. He mustered an extraordinarily wide front, a “front of all” that includes almost all the leftist oppositionbut also to the main representatives of economic power, social democrats, conservative liberals, the left-wing environmentalist Marina Silva and the liberal social democrat Fernando Henrique Cardosoamong others.
Nor was his campaign dominated by street mobilization or sharp factionalism. On the contrary, there were explicit guidelines for supporters not to confront Bolsonarista voters, and even downplay the PT’s traditional red color at campaign events. Y although his coalition had prepared a leftist political program, Lula ignored it in the debatesdodged him in speeches to voters and the media, stressing on several occasions that he would not take divisive positions, especially when it comes to his plans for the economy: same arguments used by Alberto Fernández in his 2019 campaign.
Throughout the campaign in fact, Lula Da Silva built an image of promoter of peace, pointing out the need to resolve the conflicts that multiply between the different social segments. Bolsonaro and the Bolsonarista forces, on the other hand, fully occupied the anti-systemic political space (a line similar to the one maintained today by the former president Mauricio Macriexposed in his book “So that”). The outgoing president based his campaign on verbal attacks against the corporate media, especially the largest television network, Globo, the Brazilian Supreme Court and universities.
In a country that has traditionally witnessed the intimidation, blackmail and murder of electoral opponents in the urban peripheries and in the interior of the country, Bolsonaro’s rhetoric put Brazil at risk of widespread political violence. Several murders were attributed to disputes between supporters of the two candidates. A scenario more similar to the one that occurred in the United States with donald trump. And that ended with the violent seizure of the Capitol in Washington.
The way out of the deep crisis in which Brazil has plunged in the last decade will require a Brazilian New Deal that pushes for much-needed structural changes in labor law. But for this, Lula must seek reconciliation and rebuild bridges between the polarized segments of society. Something that will not be easy, given the enormous resistance that it will meet in Congress.
Although many saw the results of the elections of October 2 last as a clear victory for Lula Da Silva and the Brazilian left, a deeper analysis reveals a different reality. Lula won 57 million or 48 percent of the vote, less than many polls had predicted, propelling him into a runoff with Jair Bolsonaro.
Jair Bolsonaro got 51 million votes, two million more than in the first round of the 2018 presidential election. This despite the fact that his government failed in its economic policies, the handling of the pandemic, the fight against corruption and the climate change agenda, especially with regard to curbing Amazon deforestation.
In the parliamentary and gubernatorial elections, which also took place on October 2, right-wing parties and, in particular, the extreme rightbehaved much better than the polls showed: they won more representatives in the two chambers of parliament than the PT and its allies, so they will have a majority for complicate a good part of the projects that Lula da Silva sends to the Brazilian congress.
Among those elected to parliament is the former judge sergio morowho led the anti-corruption investigation that landed Lula in jail; Damares Alves, the loudest proponent of the “gender ideology” conspiracy theory, which claims that family values are under threat; and former health minister Eduardo Pazuello, who mishandled the response to the pandemic. They were all ministers of the Bolsonaro government who now appear as decisive opponents of the new administration, which will face, like that of Alberto Fernández in Argentina, possible setbacks for the approval of the budget and reforms for economic purposes.
by RN
