Little information has come out about the counter-offensive that the Ukrainian army has started in Kherson. What is clear is that its outcome could have major consequences for both Ukraine and Russia, and not just strategically.
It is actually the biggest war news from Ukraine since the (difficult) Russian conquest of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, but there is little information about it. A week ago, the Ukrainian army launched a counter-offensive in the south, ultimately aimed at retaking Kherson, the strategically located city at the mouth of the Dnipro in the Black Sea. The Ukrainian authorities keep journalists at a distance and provide little explanation. They call on not to share anything about acts of war, not even on social media. There is also little reliable information from the Russian side – although the propaganda is already crowing about a failed offensive.
The contrast with previous wars, and also earlier phases of this war, is great. The post-war generation had already become familiar with daily images of the front during the Vietnam War. After the Cold War, the ’embedded’ reporting of Western intervention wars followed. Social media plays a major role in this war, especially if the authorities are not loose-spoken and journalists are kept at a distance – as they are now.
Ukrainian authorities cite operational interests as the primary reason – keep your enemy in the dark about the size and location of your troops and assets. And of your military plans. Other possible considerations: An offensive takes more patience than the media has. And military conflict is not a sporting competition. Some points count more than others and some standings can be misleading.
Intense shelling
Fleeting images of the battlefield, unreliable in their nature as a gauge, show classic elements of heated combat and maneuver warfare on the ground: Ukrainian soldiers moving in armored vehicles, or walking one after the other, one at a time, through an open field , tanks flanking; as well as combat at very close range, whether in trenches or near buildings or bridges. Movies circulate from both sides of infantrymen under fire, firing back, sometimes in panic, at an unseen enemy.
Such intense battle has a devastating effect on everyone involved. As a US World War II report put it, “There is no such thing as getting used to warfare. Every moment of the battle creates such pressure that men will collapse according to the intensity and duration of their exposure to it.’ Most soldiers, if they were still alive, were exhausted after 140 to 180 days.
There are reports of some Ukrainian territorial gains and much more intense shelling of targets in Kherson. On Sunday, Ukraine reported the recapture of Vysokopillia. What is certain is that the Ukrainians have taken the time to prepare their offensive. All summer, with partisans in occupied territory and with Western precision artillery, they have weakened the enemy with attacks on ammunition depots, command posts and critical infrastructure, such as the bridges over the Dnipro that allow the Russians to supply their troops in the city. “Our strategy is to create chaos in Russian ranks,” Mykhailo Podolyak, a senior adviser to President Zelensky, told in mid-August. The Guardian. He also said that Ukraine will not attack as Russia did, with huge numbers of troops and tactics from the last century.
wide front
But Russia did not sit still, either, and was given time to dig into defensive positions and significantly bolster its forces on the ground. Unpleasant estimation there are 15 to 25 thousand Russian soldiers on the west bank of the Dnipro. A glance at the map is enough to conclude that a classic open ground counteroffensive can be heavy, difficult and bloody. Even if Ukraine, unlike Russia, succeeds in deploying infantry, artillery and tanks in an integrated manner. Even then, it counts heavily that Ukraine does not have dominance in the air.
Kyiv says the attack is on a broad front. Before a possible urban war in Kherson can come to pass, a large area on the west bank of the Dnipro must be recaptured. The first few days saw quite a few reports of panic among some Russian military personnel. More recently, there were reports that Ukraine has been pushed back in at least one place.
Uncertainty about the exact situation on the battlefield can still take a while. In addition to military and political factors, Kyiv must also take psychological into account. Rain in the fall will complicate an offensive. And the referendums with which Russia will annex Kherson and other conquered areas are also coming. But Kyiv cannot afford the casualness with which Russian commanders squander the lives of their soldiers on the battlefield.
War is ‘essentially a moral struggle’, writes John Keegan in his classic The Face of Battle (1976). It requires an ‘act of will’ from both sides to be sustained until a party ‘morally collapses’. There the Ukrainians, who are fighting for their survival, have a great advantage. But whether that will be enough is an open question. Ukrainian soldiers along all front lines say quite consistently that they outgunned and do not have enough heavy artillery.
‘No needless death’
A month ago, Ukrainian General Dmytro Marchenko, one of the military leaders of the counter-offensive, told Le Monde: ‘Our authorities in Kyiv have been talking about a counter-offensive for some time now. But we start from the reality of the situation on the ground: for a counter-offensive we need to triple the number of soldiers, fighters and artillery systems. I don’t want to send my soldiers to unnecessary death for an attack on well-armed positions.’
His words make it clear how much is at stake in this offensive. A win could give the Ukrainians wings and further crush Russian morale. But a disappointing offensive coupled with over-inflated expectations could, for the first time in this war, damage confidence in Zelensky’s decisions and the military leadership. And the consequences could be huge – on Ukrainian morale and on the course of the war.
The fog of war over the battlefield extends to the precise target of the offensive. Kherson is undoubtedly a target, sooner or later, but that does not automatically mean a classic counter-offensive, for which the means may not be sufficient. The attacks could also be part of the wider campaign to further demoralize Russia and make the military situation in and around Kherson increasingly precarious for the Russians. Lawrence Freedman, the authoritative British war expert at King’s College, thinks so too. In the Financial Times he writes“This campaign is not simply about retaking territory, but it is also against Russia’s will to continue a futile and expensive war.”
Soldiers at the front
The lack of information makes a report of Matthew Luxmoore in The Wall Street Journal last week, not far from the front, extra valuable. They are conversations with eight wounded Ukrainian soldiers and one of the doctors who patch them up. The Ukrainians report progress, but at a high cost. The Russians are well armed and are fighting back hard, they say, with everything they have. And that is ‘a lot of equipment, but few people’.
According to 32-year-old Ivan, the assignment to the military was simple. ‘Go inside, fuck them up, retake what is ours’. They are being bombarded by artillery, tanks, helicopters, mortars. ‘The men want to fight,’ says Ivan, ‘they are making progress.’ Some Russians have left their positions, he says, leaving booby traps on their killed comrades. ‘In some areas we are making progress’, says Pavlo (22), ‘in others we are being hit hard.’
A doctor feels sorry for the soldiers and speaks of a flood of wounded. “When such a large number of wounded came in, I felt sorry for them and began to wonder if this (offensive, red.) it is worth.’ The doctor has not seen such numbers of wounded come in since the beginning of the war. What is remarkable, he says, is how eager the wounded are to be patched up again to continue fighting at the front.