Giorgia Meloni’s victory in the Italian elections constitutes a major political challenge for the European Union and for democracy. As much as the leader of the Brothers of Italy moderated her speech in the last days of the campaign and after the elections, it is difficult to avoid the shock that his victory has caused. When Meloni sits in the European Council chair reserved for Italy, predictably before the end of the year, more than two decades of far-right cordon sanitaire will come crashing down. The President of the Commission herself, Ursula von der Leyen, who pushed the warnings about what this victory could mean to the limit, will have to accept the facts and receive it with the blessings reserved for new presidents. Twenty-four hours after the elections, the list of those who had congratulated him was short: the presidents of Hungary, Viktor Orbanand from Poland, Andrzej Duda, Marine Le Pen, Santiago Abascal and other leaders of the most extreme global right… Something unusual that reveals the depth of the upheaval and explains why a question is sweeping Europe today: how to deal with Giorgia Meloni?
It is time to analyze not only the peculiarities of the Italian electoral map, but also the tectonic forces that shake the European continent in favor of a right that until recently was banned. Beyond an electoral law that was favorable to whoever managed to form a winning coalition (the right has been capable of it, and the center and the left, which have added half of the votes, have not), the existing malaise in the Italian society the fact that Meloni has won in most social sectors, while Matteo Salvini, with promises of command and control, he fished for votes among the most disadvantaged voters that we continue to mistakenly see as exclusive fishing grounds of the left. Also, Silvio Berlusconi added another 8%. Little, but enough to condition Meloni on issues in which Il Cavaliere has his own agenda, among others, relations with Vladimir Putin. In particular if he is elected president of the Senate, where he has obtained a seat.
It could be that Meloni’s recent moderation was more than just an electoral ploy. His accession to NATO and the EU and his distancing from Putin have served to capture votes from Berlusconi, but it does not seem that this is the origin of his turn. The ambitious Italian policy knows that it has to lose in a frontal assault on the Brussels institutions. Rome is not Budapest. It’s not even Warsaw. Is much more. In such a way that an attack on freedoms like the one suffered by the Hungarians, or an attack on the judiciary like the one practiced by the Polish Government, would set off all the alarm signals in Brussels. Chances are Meloni is preparing for a long-range strategy, taking advantage of the weakness of the EU.
Coping with it effectively also requires a long-term strategy. It is the one that the democratic parties should adopt to respond to the challenge that their victory has meant. It is of little use to demonize it as if it were Mussolini himself. She doesn’t even have to be the follower of his reference politician, Giorgio Almirante, who revived fascism in Italy after the war. Fighting her successfully involves criticizing her for what she is, a woman of the extreme right, and for what her government does in three decisive scenarios for the future of the EU: individual liberties, (authentic) adherence to the European project, and the inalienable defense of sovereignty (today that of Ukraine). And even more, for present an alternative that responds to the concerns of voters and is not drowned out by the noise of divisions and quarrels.