“The future of our two countries is very much an echo chamber for the rest of Europe. An echo that is listened to by others. Because together with Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands form a central region, which is of great importance.’
This is what Cyrill Jean Nunn (64), ambassador in The Hague since last autumn. His childhood in Belgium left him with a knowledge of and appreciation for the Dutch language. Now he is astonished at the lack of interest here in nurturing Dutch, let alone learning the language of its large neighbor Germany.
But when Chancellor Olaf Scholz comes to The Hague on Thursday for consultations with Prime Minister Rutte, he will find one of Germany’s ‘closest and most like-minded partners’, whose ‘critical’ EU debates also come in handy in Berlin. Because Germany is ‘always looking for the right balance in what we can and cannot do in Europe’. And the Netherlands ‘is at the center of those debates’.
German foreign policy has taken a major turn with Putin’s renewed invasion of Ukraine. How would you summarize this ‘Zeitenwende’?
‘As the word says. There is a time of yesterday and a time of tomorrow. And in between is a Wende, a completely new positioning of the German government.’
Fighting in the coalition, hesitation about arms support to Ukraine, quarrel with the Ukrainian ambassador. The turn didn’t always look pretty or convincing.
‘You describe the time before the Wende. There is continuity in German history since 1945. Adenauer went to Moscow in 1955 to get German soldiers out of the camps. For a long time we had diplomatic relations only with the Soviet Union. So there has been a special relationship with the Soviet Union since the beginning, and later with Russia. That includes the Ostpolitik who helped us extremely well and made German reunification possible.
‘After 1991 you had an understanding in German politics that we could invest further in this relationship. But the world was changing and critics said: we need to reconsider the interaction with this partner, who is also changing. The war in Ukraine acted as a catalyst to expose all these pain points. And within 48 hours of its start, Chancellor Scholz announced the Zeitenwende.’
Yet some allies continue to frown: can Germany be trusted?
“From a certain reticence, we have now switched to a policy of being at the forefront. You can criticize the pace, but you can’t say it isn’t happening. In economic terms, we are definitely giving up on coal, gas – which is the hardest – and oil. We send heavy weapons, with the Netherlands. Ukrainians are educated in Germany. And in financial terms, Germany is at the forefront. Chancellor Scholz said on May 8: “Russia will not win this war, we will take care of that.”
As part of the turnaround, Germany will invest 100 billion euros in defense and spend 2 percent of GDP on defense on a structural basis. German defense spending will be the highest in Europe. With what purpose?
“The main reason is that we feel threatened, and so do our allies. This money will be used to patch up our neglected armed forces. The amount shows how much we still have to do! And the government will buy stuff off the shelf, including American F-35s, and not go through that very long process of producing them themselves. The chancellor mentioned that 2 percent because we want to become a stronger pillar of the European and NATO defenses – and we want to reassure our neighbors that this involvement will continue.’
Then energy. Against the protests of Eastern European neighbors and others, Germany held on to the Nordstream-2 pipeline to Russia even after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Why?
‘The integration of the German economy with Russia as an energy supplier also goes way back. This was based on the philosophy of Walk through Trade, which has served us well – politically intelligent and economically viable. One of the parties is, or should have been, tied in because of the market in which it sells its products. It was not easy to say goodbye to a policy of some sixty years old. It is (in 2014, red.) did not happen. Now it is.’
Just last year, President Steinmeier referred to the legacy of World War II as justification for the pipeline, much to the anger of Ukrainians. Why has German war debt been projected almost exclusively on Moscow for so long?
‘After the Second World War, we only had contact with the Soviet Union, not with the Soviet republics. After 1990, Germany provided massive financial support to those countries, including Ukraine. We saw them as new members of the European family. But Moscow, Russia, remained the center of many political questions, including about our understanding of our history. Now we can say there was a mismatch. But it’s not black and white.’
The question is whether and how the European Union will change as a result of the war. President Macron proposes a ‘political community’, a club for friendly countries outside the deeply integrated EU. How does Germany stand in this debate?
“The German government has always emphasized that the road to the EU is not blocked for European countries, although there are demands. Now North Macedonia and Albania are in the crosshairs. For other countries, such as Ukraine, the same applies as for all those countries: by interacting with us daily, by reforming yourself, each of these countries has a path. About the way of that path, and the speed – that’s in everyone’s hands.’
Macron also warned of a “humiliation” of Russia. How does Germany view the endgame in Ukraine?
“Now it’s about supporting Ukraine and making sure they win this war. There is an aggressor and there is a country that has been invaded. Our entire energy is focused on that. Because Russia attacked Ukraine. Point. The fact that Russia, like Poland, is a great neighbor will not change. That will be at the heart of the discussion of how to rearrange our balance of interests and power when the war is over and Ukraine is restored as a sovereign, non-threatened entity.”
What does the German agenda in the European Union look like?
‘Climate is of immense importance to the current coalition. Purchasing power too. The ruling politicians have been elected on those two issues. Germans want the EU to remain a safe house, with a good balance between give and take. So we always have to check: what do we have to give in order to keep taking? That big debate is coming. And for Germany, the convoy must move together, however difficult that may be.
‘That is also the core of our discussions with the Netherlands. I am not a friend of people who say: ‘The Netherlands is so small, what is said here is irrelevant.’ That is simply not true. The same applies to the criticism that the Netherlands is too provincial: there is a lot of thought going on here. The Dutch contribution is very much in the mindset which is also ours: what can we afford? What do the others need?’
The Netherlands is always looking for how influence should be exercised. Coalitions of smaller countries? Influencing German-French cooperation?
‘The EU is not a German-French Union. It is, however, the core of the Union on which we can pile other interests. As far as we are concerned, the Netherlands is also in that core: a founder state with an excellent reputation when it comes to not blocking things. An EU country showing solidarity, but – and that is very good – there is no automatism here. There is an audience, a government and a parliament that all want to know what’s going on. And those critical discussions also benefit us, we listen in.
‘In the balance of interests between what we can and cannot do in Europe, the bilateral dialogue between our two countries is very important, as is the Dutch dialogue with France. In my view, the Netherlands is currently at the center of those debates. And that’s what Chancellor Scholz will be talking about when he’s here: balancing these European debates. Where do our public opinion, our interests converge? So the Netherlands certainly has a European role to play.’
How does the war affect German attitudes towards America? And can this bring Europe and America closer together on attitudes towards China?
“The US is an indispensable partner. The big question is: how do we make this positive force compatible with a growing European consciousness, also a positive force? The US is now fully engaged in a war that was not expected six months ago. This could be a meltdown of the platform on which we will later jointly relate to China, I don’t rule that out.’
What could be done better in the bilateral relationship?
‘I recently visited the Dutch language faculty at the University of Münster. There are more than five hundred students who study Dutch. Many want to become a Dutch teacher in Germany. Out of natural interest, because they come from the border region, but also because the Netherlands is an attractive society for them.
“When I look across the border, it’s much less. But it is very important to work on understanding what Germany is about. Mutual understanding is the basis.’
We don’t study enough German and pay too little attention to Germany?
“It has something to do with language, yes.”
We are even losing our own language at our universities.
‘Yes, but then the Germans will speak it for you! (laughs) I always defend the Dutch language here. We can all speak perfect English, but there is no alternative to the native language. Too often I come across people who have never read anything by Jeroen Brouwers.’