Four questions about the AIVD agent who infiltrated the Iranian nuclear program

While the cabinet knew nothing about it, a Dutch AIVD agent is said to have sabotaged the Iranian nuclear program in 2007. How exactly does that work? Five questions about news from de Volkskrant.

1 What did the covert operation consist of?

Dutch engineer Erik van Sabben, recruited by the AIVD intelligence service, played a leading role in the sabotage of Iran’s nuclear weapons program in 2007 by smuggling a virus into a nuclear complex. That writes de Volkskrant Monday, based on intelligence sources.

The newspaper already wrote in 2019 about the Dutch involvement in the sabotage campaign, but it was not yet known that the Dutch agent had introduced the virus. Politicians are also said to have been unaware of the secret mission, meaning the possible implications were not considered in advance. The sabotage delayed Iran’s nuclear weapons program by an estimated several years. The so-called Stuxnet virus led to unrest worldwide. Van Sabben died two weeks after the operation from a motorcycle accident in the United Arab Emirates.

2 Can the AIVD just install a virus in Iran?

The powers of the AIVD are regulated in the Intelligence and Security Services Act. It states, among other things, that services may protect Dutch ‘interests’ by taking ‘measures’ with the aid of a ‘technical aid’. According to intelligence expert Willemijn Aerdts of Leiden University, this sentence in the law provides a basis for operations such as those in Iran. How far the service may go with sabotage actions abroad has not been precisely determined, says Aerdts. “Where the border lies has not completely crystallized. The service must make its own assessment of the impact and proportionality of such an operation.”

“It is a twilight zone,” says researcher Ben de Jong of the Institute of Security and Global Affairs in The Hague. “Secret operations are often at the intersection of war and peace.”

A group of lawyers who drew up a charter for the United Nations on how states may defend themselves against foreign threats previously stated that the cyber operation in Iran can be qualified as an act of violence.

Also read
‘Dutch sabotaged Iran nuclear weapons program without the knowledge of The Hague’

3 What did the cabinet know about the secret operation in Iran?

Nothing, according de Volkskrant. Both then Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende and then Minister of the Interior Guusje ter Horst, responsible for the AIVD, were said not to have been informed by the intelligence service.

According to the law, the AIVD must ask the minister for permission if the service wants to use special powers. To prevent the minister from having to sign piles of papers every week, this permission can usually be outsourced to an AIVD employee. But when it comes to far-reaching powers, such as internet tapping, the minister must sign himself.

According to UN lawyers, the cyber operation in Iran can be classified as an act of violence

According to expert Willemijn Aerdts, a sabotage operation in Iran is such an operation that should be discussed in advance with the minister. “As a service you absolutely need political cover for that.”

However, the practice is less black and white, explains a former senior intelligence service official who spoke with him on condition of anonymity. NRC speaks. “It mainly comes down to the instincts of the head of department. They must sense how often and in detail the minister wants to be informed about ongoing operations.” According to the AIVD official, this varies per minister. “Some ministers want to know everything down to the last decimal point, while others hold back a bit. They think: I can’t do anything with it and I’m only making myself vulnerable with all that knowledge.”

4 And why did the House of Representatives know nothing about it?

The House of Representatives can be informed confidentially about secret operations. This is done in a special committee for the intelligence and security services, which includes the faction leaders of the largest five parties. Geert Wilders, the largest party, is currently the chairman of this ‘Sticky Committee’. What is discussed is secret, but according to de Volkskrant in any case, there would not have been any discussion of the cyber attack on Iran.

Various political parties have now demanded clarification. NSC MP Jesse Six Dijkstra, among others, believes that politicians should have been informed about the mission, because parliamentary control could not have taken place in this way.

According to expert Ben de Jong, practice shows that the Secretly committee “doesn’t amount to that much”. The Minister is also not obliged to share such operations with this committee.

Moreover, says De Jong, the question is what the AIVD itself actually knew about the mission. According to de Volkskrant the American secret service CIA withheld information about the cyber attack from the AIVD. The Dutch service would never have known that its agent was used by the Americans to smuggle in the virus.

“That is not unusual in the intelligence world,” says Ben de Jong. “You provide a service to an ally in good faith, hoping that it will go well.” That’s just how it works in the world of secrets, says De Jong. “Countries can be each other’s allies, but secret services are never one hundred percent allies. They rarely provide full disclosure, and they can always do something behind your back that you don’t like.”

Also read
Nervousness about new nuclear deal with Iran

To share





Email the editor