For the first time in the United States, sanctions were proposed without the condition of “invasion”. What is important to know

• sanctions against the Swiss company – the operator of the Nord Stream 2 project Nord Stream 2 AG or another similar company, as well as their top managers, if the German government allows the gas pipeline to be certified;

• sanctions against at least 15 non-US persons (individuals or entities) who, after October 1, 2021, “under the direction or at the direction of the Russian government or its unofficial representatives” were involved in activities that destabilize Ukraine or in cyber attacks on Ukrainian government websites or critical infrastructure;

• sanctions against Promsvyazbank (PSB) or other financial institutions included in the list of 11 names (VTB, VEB.RF, RDIF, Alfa-Bank, Sberbank, Gazprombank (GPB), Credit Bank of Moscow (MCB), Rosselkhozbank (RSHB), ” Opening”, Sovcombank, Transcapitalbank (TKB), if they knowingly participated in transactions in the interests of the Russian military responsible for operations in the Donbass or Crimea or a troop buildup near the Ukrainian borders after December 1, 2021.

All of these possible sanctions imply the freezing of assets in US jurisdiction and a ban on US companies and citizens from doing business with sanctioned persons; for individuals – also a ban on entry into the United States.

Recently, the US administration has repeatedly outlined a possible set of sanctions against Russia, but has constantly emphasized that in the context of the Ukrainian situation, economic sanctions cannot be applied in a preventive manner – they can only be triggered by military or paramilitary actions. Asked on Feb. 11 whether pre-invasion sanctions are possible, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan reiterated that his administration is sticking to the old strategy: the threat of specific sanctions is designed to keep Russia from military escalation.

However, there was also evidence that sanctions are possible without a full-fledged military escalation of the conflict. In January, US President Joe Biden warnedthat Russia could use unconventional tactics against Ukraine, such as cyberattacks or offensives by units “not wearing Russian military uniforms.” According to the President of the United States, such attacks in the gray zone will also be a trigger for a possible response from Washington, including sanctions. Even in the absence of a military conflict, the likelihood of less harsh measures such as a ban on the participation of US investors in the secondary market for Russian government debt increases, the Fitch rating agency indicated in February. The Washington Post wrote this week that Russian hackers likely penetrated Ukraine’s military, energy and other critical computer networks extensively.

The second block of potential sanctions proposed by the republican bill are measures dependent on the escalation of the Ukrainian conflict. The rationale for imposing such sanctions is described differently than in the Democratic Senators’ bill, adding that “offensive operations in cyberspace” would also be considered a principled escalation. It will be up to the President of the United States to decide whether an escalation worthy of sanctions has taken place (in practice, he delegates such powers, for example, to the State Department or National Intelligence). The leadership of the relevant committees of the Senate or the House of Representatives (committees on foreign affairs, on the armed forces and on intelligence) can apply to the president with a request for such a decision.

Among such sanctions, which should be introduced in the event of an escalation of Russian “aggression” against Ukraine:

• blocking sanctions against VTB, VEB, RDIF and Alfa-Bank (all four simultaneously), as well as against at least four banks from the following list: Sberbank, GPB, MKB, RSHB, Otkritie, PSB, Sovcombank, TKB;

• secondary sanctions against foreign banks that will engage in “material transactions” with Russian banks included in the sanctions list;

• sanctions against at least 15 non-American businessmen (“oligarchs”) whose names are included in the secret appendix to the “Kremlin report” of January 2018 or who should have been included in this list if it were compiled now;

• sanctions, including visa bans, against the President, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Defense Minister and key military leaders of Russia;

• a complete ban on American transactions with Russian government debt issued after the entry into force of the law;

• sanctions “in the interests of US national security” against Russian and foreign companies operating in the sectors of oil and gas production, mining of metal ores and production of metals, extraction of minerals;

• sanctions against Belarusian military leaders, officials and banks, such as Belarusbank or Sberbank, in the event that Russian “aggression” is carried out from the territory of Belarus.

The biggest impact on the Russian financial sector would be if the US placed major Russian state-owned banks on the SDN list or otherwise restricted their ability to conduct foreign exchange transactions, Fitch Ratings wrote in a Feb. 17 review. However, its analysts note that such a development of events is very far from the baseline scenario. “We believe that full restrictions on foreign exchange transactions of state-owned banks are unlikely, as this would lead to their inability to execute transactions with foreign counterparties and to losses for the latter,” Fitch said. The 12 institutions listed in the sanctions bills have foreign exchange assets ranging from 14 to 33% of total assets.

At this point, it is unlikely that the NYET bill will be approved in the US Congress and put to a vote at all. In recent weeks, Republicans and Democrats in the Senate have been unsuccessfully negotiating a cross-party consensus bill with anti-Russian sanctions, notes CNN and the Republican project may be “part of a negotiating tactic to get Democrats back on the negotiating table over bipartisan sanctions.” “It’s a shame that the Republicans in the Senate have decided to choose party posturing instead of working together to reach consensus,” Menendez said, commenting on the Republican initiative on sanctions against Russia.

The Biden administration continues to publicly object to sanctions proposals not tied to a potential Russian “invasion” of Ukraine. Even assuming the passage of such a bill, the executive branch in the United States, as a rule, enjoys broad powers to implement even “mandatory” sanctions coming from Congress in the format and volume that is preferred by the current administration.