Let us first define the political framework of reference: the public Social Security scheme, Safeguarded by article 41 of the Spanish Constitution, it is the instrument by which the public powers will guarantee “adequate and regularly updated pensions” (article 50). It is a model that responds to four principles: the distribution –the social contributions of the workers are destined to finance the benefits of the pensioners–, proportionality, public management and sufficiency.
The universality of this model distinguishes between two types of benefits: contributory, linked to the contributions of workers during their years of contribution, and the non-contributory, that are intended to cover the needs of people who have not contributed, or have not contributed the established minimums. Now a report by Minister Escrivá reveals a mismatch in these criteria: Social Security has paid non-contributory benefits for three decades with social security contributions, such as health care, the minimum pension complement, quota bonuses or birth aid, in greater proportion than the one that the State has lent to this organism money coming from the General Budgets.
In total, 140,000 million euros of expenses assumed by Social Security in the last 30 years to pay benefits that should have been covered by taxes. The magnitude of this figure can be summarized as follows: more than one year of retirement pensions could be paid in Spain. Although if we put on the other side of the scale the debt of the Social Security with the State, the balance (a surplus that the pension system could have had) is close to 30,000 million euros.
Minister Escrivá, in his previous position as president of the Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility (Airef), already warned of these “improper expenses” and he said that if they were transferred to the State, Social Security would be in balance or in a slight surplus. The proof of this is that the deficit has been reduced since 2021 with transfers so that the State assumes 100% of non-contributory benefits. In short, it is about making effective the first recommendation of the Toledo Pact to preserve the sustainability of the model: liquidate the non-contributory expenses that Social Security has been assuming in order to return to an effective separation of financing sources. The historical deviation of the destination of part of the funds of the organization is not only significant due to the volume of the figure, but also because it distorts the perception of the extent to which the pension system is sustainable.
In conceptual terms, the defense of the reference social model raises the need not to overload the building to prevent it from collapsing due to excess weight, but what cannot be done is artificially overload the pension pillar. Its sustainability is already in question for objective reasons: the aging of the population, unemployment in the long cycles of crisis and the tight contribution bases of the new generations. The pension piggy bank, however, cannot have artificial holes. Getting the population to accept what adjustments are necessary to rebuild it must be based on clear and transparent accountability.