The fact that PS cannot properly monitor is because it mainly looks at the money that the NOM invests in the Drenthe economy. But according to the Court, too little attention is paid to the consequences of this. The only indicator that the Provincial Council does look at is the effect on the number of new jobs.
However, says the Court of Audit, this does not give a reliable picture because that indicator is “based on the expectation at the time an intention was agreed with a company”. Whether that expectation will ultimately come true, is not checked by the NOM. “No one checks afterwards whether the company actually establishes itself in the North.”
According to the Court of Audit, Groningen and Friesland in particular are not on top of it.
According to the Northern Court of Audit, Drenthe officials and deputy Henk Brink indicate that the results in Drenthe “are not in proportion to the expenditure”. Yet they want to nuance that picture. For example, the deputy says that the Drenthe economy is different from that in the two other northern provinces. For example, Groningen has a university and an academic hospital.
According to the Court of Audit, Brink does say that the NOM strengthens the North and thus also Drenthe. “For example, jobs or facilities are created for Drenthe in the other provinces,” the Court of Audit writes. But it is not clear how large that effect actually is. According to the Court of Audit, no figures are kept on this.
The information that the Provincial Executive of Drenthe provides to the Provincial Council is generally clear, according to the Court of Audit. “With one exception, the documents are shared in a timely manner. Members of Parliament take an involved position in the meetings: several political groups ask critical questions and if Members of Parliament do not agree with an answer, they continue to ask questions.”
There are also protocols for information provision in the three provinces. “The agreements of the province of Drenthe are somewhat more specific than those of the two other provinces. In Drenthe, the Provincial Executive sends NOM’s annual reports to the Provincial Council; not in Groningen and Friesland.” The Court also states that the States of Drenthe are more actively involved when the NOM is discussed in meetings than in the other provinces.
The province of Drenthe says in a response that it partly agrees with the findings of the Northern Court of Audit. Nevertheless, Drenthe does not think that the quality of the information about the social results is inadequate. “But we do see opportunities to improve the information. The NOM is currently investigating improvements together with the other Regional Development Agencies (ROMs).”
The province also finds it difficult to indicate to what extent the NOM contributes to ‘economic strengthening’. “Sometimes it is indirect and almost always it is in collaboration with other parties. The NOM does not have a determining role in many activities, but a role as a driver.”
The province says the following about the unreliability of the expectation of the number of new jobs in the Northern Netherlands: “After the final choice of location and the provision of the confirmation letter (when something is final, ed.) to the NOM, it can indeed take years before the new location is actually operational.”
The province wants to nuance that image of unreliability. “This also depends on obtaining the necessary permits, construction, delivery of machines, training new employees, etc. In addition, production companies gradually build up their production: only after a few years production is at full capacity.”
Drenthe says it takes the recommendations of the Northern Court of Audit ‘to heart’ and also wants to ‘look for good and reliable indicators’ to be able to measure the results of the NOM. “But we want to guard against a disproportionately greater reporting obligation for the NOM and the companies that purchase its services. This must be proportionate to the goal.”