Germany is in shock, almost in an identity crisis. The debate about Russia is infinitely fiercer than in the Netherlands, Belgium or France. The fear of war is closer under the skin of the eastern neighbors. In Berlin, Moscow doesn’t feel nearly as far away as it does in Amsterdam; geography counts. Historical experiences are also closer to the surface.
And now Germany has to abruptly say goodbye to decades of relaxation policy towards Moscow. Long before the now maligned Chancellor Schröder (SPD), the high values of diplomatic relaxation and continental peace went hand in hand with the cool safeguarding of (West) German economic interests, the import of cheap gas for industry and households leading the way. The first (the values) was discussed a lot, the second (the interests) much less.
The latter takes revenge, now the Zeitenwende of Chancellor Scholz (SPD) must take concrete shape and the whole country has a say in the discussion about war and peace. The loudest voices demand that the Scholz government punish Russians harder and deliver weapons to Ukrainians faster. This criticism comes from the opposition but also from the co-ruling Greens. According to of the mirror those turned into “olive greens,” so fast was the conversion of “pacifists to armor fans.”
In this atmosphere, a open letter of 28 intellectuals and artists (including writers Juli Zeh and Martin Walser), who advocated restraint, last week received scorn† They wrote a little too easily that we should not provoke Putin.
More impressive was the intervention of Jürgen Habermas in the Süddeutsche Zeitung† Europe’s foremost living philosopher supports Chancellor Scholz’s commitment to ‘weigh risks’. With all understanding for the desire to stop brutal injustice, Habermas nevertheless shows himself “annoyed” by overly confident moral indignation.
The West is faced with a huge dilemma. We support Ukraine, where the aggressor kills and rapes people. At the same time, we have partly tied our hands with the ‘equally justifiable decision’ not to become a war party, since a declaration of war would bring four of the world’s five nuclear powers into open conflict.
Hence the pressing questions in the German debate: what is light and what is heavy, which arms support for Kiev exceeds the threshold? When does this change proxywar between NATO and Russia? The tricky part is that we don’t know the answers, since – in Habermas’s terms – the “definition power” rests with Putin.
At the same time, the thinker writes, this must not lead to a ‘politics of fear’ in which the West allows itself to be blackmailed by Moscow and attacks on other states (Georgia, Moldova, …) can follow. So our war goal must be, he concludes, that Ukraine ‘must not lose’.
There is something ironic about it: the 92-year-old Habermas who looks surprised at an overdose of morality in the political debate. Like no other, he supervised the reinvention of the Federal Republic after 1945 as a ‘post-national’ peace force bound by universal values in the heart of the EU.
The pacifists who suddenly ask for weapons have not become deliberate realists, he writes, but have fallen head over heels into realism.
These sudden turns of debate are no accident, but a side effect of the deep German desire to be ‘on the right side of history’. Belonging to the right party; never again Hitler – this wish is not strange to Habermas, sixteen years old in 1945. It led to a German foreign policy that speaks in terms of values rather than classical state raison and strategic interests. With this approach, the country regained international goodwill (a vital interest in itself). But two drawbacks are becoming increasingly apparent.
First, vulnerability to the accusation of hypocrisy. The rest of the world is of course well aware that gas pipelines not only provide peace but also, yes, gas. Or – to take an earlier European crisis – that bailing out Greek public finances also helped German banks. Anyone who exercises their interests visibly but does not put them into words loses credibility.
The brusque whipping in one’s own debate is the other drawback of over-moralization. Until recently, Russia’s discourse revolved around peace, stability and (war) debt towards the Soviet Union – all with the best of intentions. Now it is: justice, democracy, Ukrainian suffering. The old moral arguments fell away on February 24, new ones take their place. In the absence of damping continuities, you get a total turnaround. And the country is dizzy now.
Luke of Middelaar is a political philosopher and historian.
A version of this article also appeared in the newspaper of May 4, 2022