The friendship between Europe’s two largest states is going through a difficult period. A meeting between Chancellor Scholz and President Macron in Berlin on October 3 – the day of German unity – went bad. A meeting of both councils of ministers scheduled for this week, one of the high points in the relationship that has been alive for decades, was canceled at last. Postponed to January 2023, with conflicting statements.
Typical of the atmosphere is a sophisticated false statement by Macron just before the last EU summit. The president pressed the German head of government to agree to the gas price cap desired by France and a majority of countries with the phrase: “I believe it is not good for Germany or for Europe if it is isolated.” Advice from a friend. This German ‘isolation’ was relative, because the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg also had little confidence in such a price ceiling, and neither did the European Commission. It must work, Scholz said imperturbably. In the end, a statement was made that everyone could agree with.
Just as the French and German views on the currency union clashed ten years ago in the euro crisis, today energy is the focal point of their conflict of interests and narrative. In September, Germany announced with great fanfare energy support for households and businesses, size: 200 billion euros. That angered many EU partners, especially because it came as a surprise. It was reminiscent of the unilateral bank guarantee issued by the Merkel government in 2008, which put pressure on the internal market. This is not the first time a government in Berlin has been so busy with coalition alignment and the home crowd that it forgets the impact of its own decisions on the rest of Europe.
France is a producer and advocate of nuclear energy, while Germany – with the Greens in government – absolutely wants to get rid of it. Paris believes that the Federal Republic has seriously miscalculated strategically with its Russian gas dependence, and thus has lost its right to speak. The fact that many French nuclear power stations are currently shut down due to technical problems and strikes and that the country receives gas from its German neighbors to make up for the gaps remains unmentioned.
In addition to energy, defense is also a source of mutual misunderstanding. In its big Zeitenwendespeech immediately after the Ukraine invasion, Olaf Scholz announced 100 billion euros in defense investments. At the same time, he sees a role for Europe as ‘power among powers’. What is more obvious – according to Paris – to buy extra weapons from European companies? Good for employment and Europe’s strategic resilience. But in practice this often means French companies, and Berlin, as a NATO ally, prefers to buy weapons from the US as well.
We need not dramatize all these acute policy annoyances. They also arise from unspoken discomfort over major strategic shifts. The Russian invasion this year represents the biggest shock to Europe since the Cold War. As in 1989, this tests continental balances and thus also the Franco-German relationship that is so central to it.
In response to the geostrategic blow, the European Union is opening up to new members. Then towards Poland, the Baltic Sea and the Balkans, now towards Ukraine and Moldova. Europe’s geographical center of gravity is shifting eastward, placing the Federal Republic of Germany at the center. France, which sees itself as a pivot and leader, is lagging behind on the Atlantic west flank – a peripheral position that has been underlined by Brexit. Just as Germany has been reflecting in fierce public debate on its relationship with Russia, its energy supply and its defense since February 24, so France also has to deal with a war shock. But instead of raising this fundamental question, it’s just bickering. Scenes from a wedding.
It does not help that both heads of government know each other poorly. Olaf Scholz had been in office for barely two months when the Russian invasion began. Compare this with the Franco-German leadership duo from 1989: François Mitterrand (1981-1995) and Helmut Kohl (1982-1996) had already worked together intensively for seven years and therefore knew exactly what they had in common when the Berlin Wall came down. And even their bond of trust threatened to break in those dramatic days.
The postponement of the Franco-German Council of Ministers until January 2023 could turn out well. The 22nd of that month is the sixtieth anniversary of the ‘Friendship Treaty’ that De Gaulle and Adenauer once concluded. Macron and Scholz will surely celebrate this diamond jubilee with big words and new plans.
Luke of Middelaar is a political philosopher and historian.
A version of this article also appeared in the October 26, 2022 newspaper