Column | Russian winter offensive now begins with phasing out gas

Russian politicians and generals have known for centuries how to destroy opponents with the cold. In 1812 Napoleons lost Grande Armeelured behind Moscow, more soldiers from hunger and frost than from bullets and bayonets. At the end of 1941, Hitler’s advance also foundered on a Russian winter offensive. Now it is Vladimir Putin who uses the monarch as a weapon to weaken and divide us.

It is striking how the German publicity is already being prepared step by step for a Cold Winter. It is the next phase of war. This weekend, a top German official sounded the alarm. On Monday 11 July, the Nord Stream 1 pipeline will close ten days before annual maintenance, but fears are that Gazprom will shut the tap for good afterwards. And then the Germans must think “very urgently” about gas savings, according to this boss of the Bundesnetzagentur, and it is highly uncertain whether all companies will be able to get enough gas this winter.

Earlier already called Minister Robert Habeck (Economic Affairs, Greens) unexpectedly cut gas supplies in mid-June an “economic attack” by Russia. He warned of an economic crisis that could turn out to be more severe than that caused by the Covid pandemic, with potentially numerous bankruptcies. “This is not yet clear to many.” The vice chancellor also sees how the Kremlin is fueling fears in our societies – of the cold, but also of inflation and poverty.

According to the same top German official, if the gas stocks do not come up to the required level this summer, hard choices lie ahead. For example: gas to food companies and the pharmaceutical industry, but not to swimming pools. And do you also like to think about which rooms in the house are allowed to be a little less.

In a captivating NRCreport on the Bergermeer gas storage field, you can read how Dutch ministers for energy policy set aside local fears of earthquakes such as in Groningen administratively by appealing to security of supply. And how that public interest was naively outsourced to global markets, without taking into account the fact that they were working with state-owned companies such as Gazprom, which look not only at market and price but also at politics and power.

However, not all conclusions are drawn in the article. Because why did Gazprom, which contractually has 42 percent of Bergermeer’s storage space, not replenish its stocks in 2021? “Surprised analysts know the empty storage is due to irrational market movements and price inflation by Russia.”

Anyone who only sees a price increase is still primarily looking through the market. Economic ‘irrationality’ goes well with a power-political logic. For example, sowing fear and division among opponents.

Did Putin plan these moves beforehand? In any case, it is striking that Germany’s largest gas storage facility, owned by a Gazprom branch, was not topped up after the winter of 2020-21. While other suppliers traditionally took advantage of the lower prices from the spring, the Gazprom subsidiary failed to top up. A conscious choice. “From April 2021 at the latest, we should have asked ourselves what strategic goal was behind that empty gas field,” said an energy expert in the German news earlier this year.

Let’s look beyond the summer. Acute gas scarcity can lead to tensions between EU member states. When German industry cannot be sufficiently supplied, the country will call on neighbors and other partners – the Netherlands and Norway first. But, people will grumble in The Hague, why did your Germans have to shut down all your nuclear power stations if necessary, as Merkel decided in 2011?

This argument does not hold up in the emergency. Compare the pandemic: when in March 2020 Dutch corona patients were transported to German border hospitals in respiratory distress due to an IC bed shortage, they did not ask when they arrived why we had cut those beds away in the years before. That debate will come later.

Speaking of corona solidarity: the hard-won EU recovery funds, which were decided in 2020, have not yet been fully spent. While the share of gifts (390 billion) is reasonably good, the pots for loans (360 billion) are largely waiting. Under the heading ‘REPowerEU’, the European Commission is currently converting these pandemic funds into support for the phase-out of Russian gas, with the support of government leaders.

It is a subtle institutional translation of European solidarity in this war, and of that the severe economic aftershocks will no doubt bring more between now and winter.

Luke of Middelaar is a political philosopher and historian.

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