The dividing line between hope and naivety is thin. Between reading sad news from Ukraine, I am overcome by a glimmer of hope. A critical Russian superstar like Alla Pugacheva makes her voice heard, we read about an alleged change in tone from state media. The internal criticism in Russia does not seem completely censored.
It General Newspaper wrote last month: “After the retreat in the Kharkov region, public criticism of the Russian army is growing. Officially that is forbidden, but it is fermenting and bubbling in Russia”. This month suggested NRC“After the painful Ukrainian recapture of the small town of Lyman for Russia, criticism is also rising in the state media.”
But is this correct? Is there indeed an increase in criticism? And if so, how should we read it? As a criticism of the war, or as a criticism of not conducting the war effectively enough? And how do we know if that criticism in Russia is not as scripted or strategic as the propaganda?
Earlier this year, the American-Russian journalist Masha Gessen spoke with numerous (former) employees of Russian state media. In her article for The New Yorker she offered a haunting glimpse into the kitchen. Weekly, if not daily, Kremlinpiefen meetings with editors, broadcasters and media chiefs. Topics that are tuned, angles checked, obligatory numbers that the journalists (if you can call them that) have to play. Since the war, the last shreds of journalistic independence have disappeared; editorial offices have been bought up, stopped or gone into hiding.
Tatiana Stanovaya, founder of think tank R.Politik, speculated on media platform Bloomberg that state television’s sudden criticism of military action was precisely intended to justify tougher intervention in Ukraine.
I myself called Pyotr Sauer, Russia correspondent for The Guardian and son of media mogul Derk Sauer. He wrote, among other things, about the louder-sounding criticism of the military leadership from far right hook. About the criticism within state media, Sauer says: “It is almost without a doubt scripted. The Kremlin is also aware that discontent must have an outlet, but one that the Kremlin is in control of.” Sauer especially keeps an eye on Telegram to see how the wind is blowing. There, right-wing nationalist bloggers and oligarchs speak out about the war. “They can afford surprisingly much at the moment. This probably means that Putin partly agrees with them and that, for example, we can expect layoffs within the military top in the coming weeks.” He thinks for a moment. “But the line of tolerance will always be drawn when slandering Putin.”
We seem to forget the following when we eagerly watch for cracks in the government loyalty of state media. There is no such thing as the media on the one hand and the Kremlin on the other. They are one. And the Kremlin’s toleration of criticism should probably be read primarily as a potential strategy, rather than portents of the much-hoped-for collapse of Putin’s Russia.
Madeleijn van den Nieuwenhuizen writes a column on this site every other week.
A version of this article also appeared in the newspaper of October 10, 2022