The realization is slowly sinking in that the war in Ukraine will have enormous consequences for the membership and shape of the European Union. Immediately after the Russian invasion, at the end of February 2022, Ukraine knocked on Europe’s door. You could not refuse that emergency call, the EU heads of government realized. In June 2022, the country was granted candidate status. Moral and political support for a beleaguered neighbor.
Reluctant governments – in Paris, The Hague or Lisbon – could then still think: oh well, a promise for the future, without concrete consequences now. But also a distant future is getting closer every day. Moreover, in the wake of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, also in Russian firing range, also had the prospect of accession. Hope also flared up again in the six Balkan countries that have long been in the EU waiting room, such as Serbia and Albania. Altogether it could bring the Union to 36 members, up from 27 now. It raises gigantic questions about money, power and security.
A breakfast between ten heads of government in the Brussels hotel Amigo, shortly before the summer break, marks the end of looking away. President Macron, Chancellor Scholz and Prime Minister Rutte invited seven colleagues for informal consultation on the significance of a major expansion eastward. Answers could not be given, but the conversation is open. It will be continued at an EU summit in Granada, Spain, at the beginning of October.
Yet one conclusion has already been drawn in hotel Amigo. Leaders acknowledged that the ‘homework’ on enlargement does not lie solely with the candidates. Certainly, they have to implement all kinds of reforms before they are ‘ready’ for, say, the internal market. The European Commission monitors it closely, report after report, year after year. Standards are fixed.
But the Union itself must also prepare itself. How can things remain manageable with more than thirty countries? How will money flows shift, with so many relatively poor entrants? Should agricultural policy be reformed as soon as major producer Ukraine joins? And what lessons can we draw from the major enlargement of 2004 with Poland and other Eastern European countries, for example with regard to the rule of law?
The Brussels jargon speaks of ‘absorptive capacity’, or the EU’s ability to absorb new members. The term gives the impression of an objective, measurable criterion (as for a sponge). But these are open, highly political questions. For this type of homework there is no standard, no review attachment with correct answers. It requires political judgment, an assessment of what must and what is possible, with a view to who wants what or who refuses what.
All these decisions will be accompanied by major political tensions in the coming years. On the one hand, there is the geostrategic need to firmly embed Ukraine and the Balkan countries in the European order. On the other hand, there are undiminished deep concerns about the cohesion and functioning of the Union when countries with weak state structures join, plus reasonable doubts about democratic support. That will collide.
Public opinion in the Netherlands or France is not eager. Of course, there is solidarity with Ukraine. But to voters in Bodegraven or Bordeaux, arms support for the fight against Putin seems something different, further away, than free movement of people for 40 million people with a level of prosperity lower than Bulgaria or a considerably larger contribution to the EU budget. An extension referendum is not easily won.
What do you do when something is both necessary and impossible? The classic way out is time. Postpone, wait, reform, see if the situation changes.
Brought last week Charles Michael, President of the European Council, the time dimension at play. He called “2030” a good target date for a (first) expansion round. Very late for some, bizarrely early for others. Such a date does, however, initiate a dynamic, such as a deadline.
The Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev, last Monday in The Hague on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the AIV and an expert on the region, called the idea that the Balkan countries would resemble the rest of the EU much more closely thanks to seven-year reforms as ‘science fiction’. You can let them in, but you can’t want everything at once.
Besides time, there is another way out of the dilemma, and that too is starting to do the rounds: soften the transition between member and non-member, between inside and outside. At the end of May Commission President Ursula von der Leyen about gradual or partial accession. Again, this has its drawbacks, but in a situation with no correct answers, it may offer a way forward.
Luke of Mediator is a political philosopher and historian.
A version of this article also appeared in the September 6, 2023 issue.