The pandemic that, after overcoming painful tests and forcing us to learn hard lessons, had to make us better, was not enough for the Government, in a situation of extreme health and economic crisis, to be able to practice the so-called co-governance, passing rather from the centralized control of the state of emergency to the centrifugation of responsibilities. Nor so that autonomous and local parties and governments of different persuasions, comfortable in the profits of grievance and insubordination, would play the role that corresponds to them in that scheme, especially in the face of pressing and common challenges. Co-governance is nothing more than the political culture and practice required by the drawing of the State of the autonomies in our Constitution, with areas of exclusive competence for each level of administration and others in which the State has reserved the establishment of criteria general that the autonomous communities can modulate. A framework that (to the satisfaction of those who object to the autonomous model) can be the cause of dysfunctions, blockages or conflicts when it is intended to overwhelm the competence framework of each one (in an invasively centralist or unsupportively selfish way) or it is preferred to intensify the conflict to work in concert in the areas in which regional and local powers concur. Something we should possibly be used to in the context of ordinary political dispute. But it is not a hopeful symptom of Spanish political culture that this continues to be the case when we face vital challenges.
The lesson (not) learned from the pandemic seems to be repeated to the letter in the face of the challenge that Spain faces this summer, with the need for energy restrictions that affect individuals and companies, due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Europe’s refusal to accept Putin’s aggression as a fait accompli, the consequences of which will be only one element, but a capital one, of a worrying economic scenario.
All European countries are proposing measures to restrict their energy consumption, first to accumulate reserves right away and make the impact of the Russian gas supply cut in winter as less harmful as possible and, secondly, to react if (or rather when) the difficulties intensify. A review of all these plans shows that the possible actions are very diverse (and therefore, we should be willing to discuss them beyond a single recipe)_but also that they can become more extreme than those proposed in Spain (such as anticipating the closing hours of shops, not only their lighting). So the debate seems to be (as shown by the few alternative contributions from those who question the Government’s plan) more on the how and the who than on the substantive and essential.
This is a scenario that perhaps we could have avoided if the dialogue between administrations had been real before proposing the first contingency plan. Or not, but if they had not accepted an outstretched hand to the real dialogue, the responsibility would be of those who had acted in an unsupportive way, and not shared (in the proportion that corresponds to each one) among all the agents of this unborn negotiation.
The failure of the meeting held this Monday between the Government and the autonomies shows that, in this first phase in which preventive measures must be taken, there is no longer any room other than to apply them (and wait for the resolution of the courts regarding those that are appealed by established pathways). But in September an even more crucial contingency plan will have to be agreed upon:_there is no excuse for the mistakes of one and the other to be repeated again. n