Are we more or less poor than a decade ago? Are the threats to the financing of public health and the pension system closer to becoming a social nightmare? Is the socioeconomic structure that has been forming in recent years irreversible? These are some of the questions that can be answered with the results of the National Census of May 19 to reaffirm or correct perceptions about long-term population trends that impact the economy slowly, but inexorably.
Revision. The first discordant note was the total of the population that the provisional figures showed a few hours later, in a concise information that the INDEC communicated: 47,327,407, of which almost 53% turned out to be women and 47%, men. If these figures are confirmed in August, when the INDEC promised that it would release the complete calculations, we would be facing a break in the trend that had been taking place in the country and then throughout the region since the middle of the last century. In the period 2001-2010, demographic growth was slightly more than 1% per year, a figure that was higher than the previous ones but that in the following eleven and a half years (1.4%) would have risen almost 30%. It is worth using the potential in this case because the differences are so striking that they are worth waiting for confirmation: either it was measured wrong, or there was a surprise with some unforeseen factor.
Anyway, projecting this single datum, IDESA warned that the The country’s economic performance in these almost twelve years (2010-22) was much worse than stipulated: against a total GDP growth of 0.2% per year (2.5% in total), the increase in population exceeded it by 1 .2% per year, so that, in reality, per capita income would have fallen almost 15% in that period.
In addition, the report of the Cordovan entity highlights that if the total population and the population employed in the labor market (which also grew by 1.4%) grew at a much higher rate than the modest increase in the production of goods and services, indicating that the other two determining factors of development –capital (investment) and efficiency– made a negative contribution to production. “There is thus a drop in productivity, since the quantity of goods and services grows less than the population. This is the key to explaining economic decline and the structural persistence of poverty,” he explains.
To graph it, they point to the emerging variable in this process, which is the investment rate (measured as a percentage of GDP) that yielded an average of 16% per year, insufficient to replenish the capital stock and expand the productive capacity for sustained growth over time. For this, it should not go below 25% per year.l for this decade.
Under Scrutiny. Alejandro Piscitelli Murphydirector of Department of Sociology of the UCA and Professor of Sociology at the UADE, has reservations about the provisional figures released. “Population growth is due to vegetative growth or migratory balance. It would not seem that either of the two aspects has had a qualitative leap to break the previous trend”, he underlines.
However, Piscitelli points out that when there is accurate data, it will be possible to have a map of the territorial distribution of the population, a factor that he does believe will have changed. The other fact that he believes will be confirmed is that of the aging of the population, which marks a key fact for public policies. “It modifies the entire agenda and not only because of an issue of resources destined for health, but also affects consumption, real estate, transportation, social security and even new sources of work to face this new configuration.
The other indicator that has been changing the human map is that of the continuous decline in fertility. For Raphael RofmanDirector of the Social Protection Program of CIPPEC, believes that the definitive number will be less than the provisional one because it is assumed that the universe is similar, but fertility has not only not risen for a long time, but has dropped quite a bit. “It is not logical that it has risen. Not that migration has changed much”risk.
On the pension issue, other issues that are sensitive to demographic changes, he emphasizes that the impact is long-term, but, on the other hand, if the census verifies that there was an acceleration in the fall in fertility, the changes will accelerate, among them a faster revision of the pension system in crisis.
Less and more. Rofman maintains that between 2015 and 2020 fertility fell by 33% throughout the country. “It’s a lot. And all the indicators we have say that it was concentrated in the poorest places with a drop of 2/3 of adolescent mothers. That does alter the education policy because it changes the demand”, he remarks. Good news for the governors, harassed by the shortcomings of the educational system? Yes, partially because, along with this reduction in spending, others linked to aging also grow. In employment, this decrease in fertility drives more women to continue their studies or demand a formal job, but the other response of the market remains: the demand for their services.. A pending issue since in the economically active population (PEA) the number of formal private jobs hardly changed.
Another interesting fact to confirm is whether population growth accelerated in the areas of small and medium-sized cities (between 20,000 and 50,000 inhabitants) to the detriment of large cities, like the suburbs of Buenos Aires. “This has to do with the fact that the development model that was very strong until 1970 lost momentum. Before, people emigrated to industrial centers and now that has changed: the most thriving sector is agriculture and its service areas”, he concludes.
Management and pension. The fact that the population of older adults grows in proportion more and more is a fact to be taken into account and an irreversible trend. in his opinionPablo Comelattoresearcher at Center for Population Studies (CENEP) and teacher of Arturo Jauretche National University (UNAJ), this slowdown trend in the growth rate in Latin America began to show itself in the countries that changed their indicators more than half a century ago: Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Cuba, which began what is called the “demographic transition”. “Aging is the theme par excellence in these figures. In 2010, the population over 65 years old already exceeded 10% and that percentage should increase in this measurement, with its impact in many aspects: transfers of resources to the elderly sector, in addition to the effect on the pension system. If there is no change in labor informality, aging is very relevant”, he argues.
Finally, Comelatto refers to the three “bonds” that mark the influence on economic variables in the long term, that is, periods that even go beyond a census. These are the demographic, gender and formality “bonuses”, which in short highlight the opportunities provided by long-term trends to carry out policies before what is insinuated becomes a present reality. The demographic refers to the changes in the population pyramid that still does not affect the economically active population to finance the pension system and that generates an opportunity for development. The same happens with gender: it offers the chance for women to considerably increase their participation in the formal labor market (even in Argentina the incidence is lower than for men). “Domestic work generates value, but it is not captured by the national accounts. (for this there are specific surveys on the use of time), something that should be corrected”, he points out. And finally, the “formality bonus”, in an economy marked by almost 40% of activity in black, “if in 10-20 years we formalize this, it is an enormous contribution.
In short, trends that go beyond the statistics and that mark the future economic policy on fire, but also the present. It is only worth remembering that almost 60% of national public spending is allocated to the pension and assistance system. A figure too relevant to leave everything to short-termism.
