Perhaps it is no coincidence that French President Emmanuel Macron wants to save Russia from a humiliating peace. Because in its eventful history, France has gained plenty of experience with various peace settlements: at one end of the spectrum, the mild peace of 1815, which for a long time kept the European continent free from major wars. On the other hand, the ‘strangle-peace’ of Versailles – imposed on the losers in 1919 – which sowed the seeds for the next world war.
In the first case, after the Napoleonic Wars that had raged for nearly a quarter of a century, France benefited from the Allied victors’ pursuit of peace and stability. England and (yes) Russia managed to prevent Prussia from taking revenge on France. Their main aim was the ‘debonapartization’ of France: the removal of the mental residues of Napoleon’s regime. An amputation of conquered France or the imposition of heavy reparations would not serve this noble endeavor, they believed.
Equal partner
The agile diplomat Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand, who had survived all the regime changes of the previous decades, was not referred to the dock as a representative of France at the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815), but took part in the negotiations on the new security architecture of Europe participates as an equal partner. In any case, given the size of its territory, its population size and its history, France would remain a great power. It could therefore be better treated as such.
In her 2018 book against terror Beatrice de Graaf showed her appreciation for the wisdom of the victors. Napoleon would have been less merciful, according to his commentary on the peace of 1815. ‘They had every advantage,’ he said – referring to his former adversaries. “But what compensation have they achieved for their country? They could have signed the peace they made if they had been defeated.’
About this author
Sander van Walsum is a historian and editor of de Volkskrant†
More than a century later, Georges Clemenceau, Prime Minister of the Third French Republic from 1917 to 1920, would take a significantly more vindictive attitude towards the losers of World War I (and also more vengeful than Otto von Bismarck after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-’71) . Defeated Germany was denied the opportunity to ever re-establish itself as a great power. At least that was the intention of Clemenceau, who in this endeavor was met with insufficient resistance from his British and American allies.
Nuclear power status
With his admonition not to pull the skin over the ears of Russia, Emmanuel Macron shows himself a realpolitiker – although that probably won’t be his choice of words. He knows that Russia can be defeated in Ukraine, but it will never be overwhelmed. If Ukraine and its Western allies wanted to, they could never force Russia into a Versailles-style peace order. The country (with 11 time zones) is simply too big for that and it is too strong militarily. Russia’s nuclear power status is a given – even if even more former Soviet republics were to distance themselves further from it.
On paper, the Viennese model offers more prospects for a lasting peace: a Russian defeat on the battlefield, a palace revolution (in this case in the Kremlin), followed by an international peace conference in which post-Putinist Russia participates as an equal partner. However, the practice will be more unruly, even if Russia were defeated, and even if there were regime change.
Not more humble
For a new Russia will not necessarily be a more humble Russia – a country that renounces its imperial past. Russia never thought it needed to look in the mirror, said Volkskrantcolleague Arnout Brouwers recently in a podcast about the war in Ukraine. And the question is whether that will ever change. Perhaps a possible defeat in Ukraine will add even more luster to the victory during the Great Patriotic War against Nazi Germany – the most glorious chapter of Russian history.
There will only be self-reflection if Russia recognizes that it was in common cause with Hitler before he invaded the Soviet Union, or if Russian historians (are allowed to) raise irreverent questions: is the large number of soldiers killed on the Russian side ( almost 11 million) during the Second World War was not partly the result of a primitive strategy and the contempt for (own) human lives? Or: has not Russia instigated the enmity of former brother nations and satellite states through its own misconduct?
This requires more than defeat in a war that still cannot be called a war in Russia. There is a Stunde Null necessary: a total defeat – as suffered by Nazi Germany in 1945 – that makes critical self-reflection inevitable. But no government leader will dare to opt for that. The Vienna option is therefore more realistic, although it will not bring pacifism to power in Russia.