It took a while – longer than I expected – but skepticism about the war in Ukraine has permeated the public debate. The Telegraph wrote about the Dutch peace movement, in Fidelity Professor of Conflict Studies Jolle Demmers tried to dampen the “war fever”, and in NRC financial geographer Ewald Engelen and technology philosopher Martijntje Smits argued for negotiations with the Russians.
Criticism of military support to Ukraine is not often heard in the media and politics. Since the beginning of the Russian invasion, there has been broad consensus on that support. What is characteristic of this consensus is that its defenders express themselves in absolute and confident terms. Ukraine MUST win, it is constantly emphasized. But in practice, military support is insufficient to achieve this goal, casting doubt on how deeply felt and widely shared this aspiration is.
Not only is the goal unclear, some arguments for military support also raise questions. One argument is indisputable: Russia has unlawfully invaded a country whose culture it wants to erase its culture and inflict violence on its people, see the Butcha massacre, the destruction of Mariupol, and the kidnapping of Ukrainians in the occupied Zaporizhia region. For the Ukrainians it is clearly important that Russia does not win the war.
But defeating Russia is also in the interests of Europe and the US, according to the consensus. A frequently heard argument is: ‘Putin will not stop in Ukraine’. If the war against Ukraine ends successfully, Putin will invade the Baltic states. But how sure are we? Is it uncontroversial that Putin will invade NATO countries while he still has his hands full with Ukraine? And vice versa: won’t Putin still want to test Article 5 (an attack on one member state is considered an attack on all member states) if he is defeated in Ukraine?
Another argument: ‘Liberal democracy is at stake’. This seems like too big a claim to me. Yes, the ‘rules-based order‘ will receive a new blow with a Russian victory (and also with the violations of the laws of war in Gaza). But an end to liberal democracy? It can’t be that black and white. Liberal democracy is not the other way around either saved if Ukraine wins. Russia will then continue to use spies and spread disinformation.
Another argument, ‘Russian victory provides a precedent for, for example, the annexation of Taiwan’, also seems too black and white to me. The West has already shown in Ukraine that it is willing to take action against wars of conquest. Does this only impress China if the entire Ukrainian territory is reconquered? Does it actually impress China at all?
I’m not saying the arguments don’t make sense, nor that they are disingenuous. It seems to me that it is clearly in the Western interest that Russia does not win the war. But the certainty with which statements such as ‘Putin will not stop in Ukraine’ are proclaimed cannot be substantiated. Instead of admitting this, those in favor of military aid seem to hope that a discussion will not arise.
Communicating about uncertainties is one of the most difficult things that politicians, journalists and scientists have to do. This was already apparent during the pandemic, when the cabinet showed itself to be overconfident about matters such as the effectiveness of the curfew. Discussion about this turned out to be hardly possible. The real opposition ultimately came from people who were far too sure of their own version of the facts, sometimes downright conspiracy theories.
The same thing is threatening now. The only ones who ask questions about the arguments for supporting Ukraine immediately go off the rails: they say that NATO provoked this war (Engelen and Smits), or that Russia has no imperialist ambitions (Demmers). Engelen states on social media that the war is a proxy war of the elite, in the interests of the military-industrial complex and intended to “roll out a European integration agenda”. Engelen, who has no in-depth knowledge of Russia or international relations, is certain that we are heading for a world war. It shows little intellectual modesty.
But you can’t completely blame him for that, because the political and media consensus also offers no room for intellectual modesty. And yet experts certainly differ in their views. For example, there is disagreement among nuclear weapons experts about how great the ‘nuclear taboo’ still is and how small the chance is that Putin will drop a nuclear bomb in a Ukrainian attack on Crimea.
These kinds of nuances rarely reach the public debate, perhaps because it is feared that they undermine support. But this does not do Ukraine any favors for those in favor of military aid. A drastic policy that is not questioned will sooner or later lead to resistance, and that is precisely when Russian propaganda has an easy time.