On Wednesday evening it became clear: this is going wrong. The cause was the request of the leaders of the separatist regions of Donetsk and Luhansk to President Putin. They asked for help in “fending off the aggression of the Ukrainian army to avoid civilian casualties and avert a humanitarian disaster in the Donbas.” A transparent justification for military action that Putin apparently deemed necessary. Around midnight, the number of worried messages from Kiev increased. Residents and (foreign) journalists expected a Russian attack in the coming hours. They were right.
Until last week, the mood was different. A large-scale invasion was thought unlikely by many. President Biden’s warnings were dismissed as war rhetoric. Analysts previously thought of an intervention in eastern Ukraine. Kiev was not seen as an obvious target, let alone Western Ukraine. Regime change would rather be achieved through sustained pressure and destabilization, not through violence. The American intelligence services were right, the others were not.
Could we have seen it? Since the invasion of Georgia in 2008, it has been clear that Putin uses military means to achieve political goals. Since the annexation of Crimea and support for the separatists in the Donbas in 2014, it has been clear that Putin wants to go far in Ukraine. More recently, there were ample signs that Putin was working toward an inevitable outcome, despite feints and denials on the Russian side. Looking back, the developments surrounding Ukraine look like a carefully prepared step-by-step plan.
2013-2014 Euromaidan
According to Putin, the ‘Ukraine issue’ was caused by Lenin, but it makes more sense to sow the seeds for this war at Euromaidan, the popular uprising around Maidan Square in Kiev at the end of 2013, early 2014. The reason was dissatisfaction with President Viktor. Yanukovych, who, under pressure from Putin, refused to sign Ukraine’s association agreement with the EU. The demonstrations ended with dozens of deaths and the departure of Yanukovych eight years ago this week. The Maidan protest, which is intensively honored and commemorated in Ukraine, was indicative of the European view of the Ukrainians.
In a stimulating article in the Financial Times from Wednesday journalist Martin Sandbu argues that the real stumbling block for Putin is not Ukraine’s intended membership of NATO, but the aspiration to join the EU. Sandbu blames 2014 and today’s aggression on Putin’s fear that Ukraine will turn away from Russia’s state-driven and autocratic economy to the EU’s free-market economy. This movement is already underway: in 2013, a quarter of Ukrainian exports went to the EU and a quarter to Russia. In 2019, 50 percent went to the EU and 10 percent to Russia.
April 2021 military build-up
In April last year, a large-scale military build-up on Ukraine’s eastern border and in Crimea caused a great deal of unrest among Western countries. Never before has Russia sent so many soldiers – an estimated 100,000 – and equipment to Ukraine. Nothing to worry about, the Kremlin said, just an exercise. It went off with a sizzle. In retrospect, it seems like a test to see how the West reacted. The withdrawal was not complete, much material remained standing. A wipe sign.
December 17, 2021 list of requirements
The beginning of the final act was the publication by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of two ‘draft treaties’ for NATO and the US. It was two list of requirements. The main demands were for the military alliance to withdraw from Central and Eastern Europe, and for a written guarantee that Ukraine and Georgia would never join NATO.
It was a farce, meant to be able to say afterwards that the opponent has failed. Russia knew that the demands were out of the question for NATO and the US. Ukraine’s membership is not on NATO’s agenda, but a ban is an intolerable concession. Negotiations in January and February therefore yielded nothing. There was Western doubt as to whether NATO was the real issue. More important seemed – and seems – Putin’s drive to return Ukraine to the Russian sphere of influence, politically, economically and ideologically.
February 15, 2022 Duma
It seemed like a formality, but it was an essential step in legitimizing a controversial decision. The lower house of the Russian parliament, the Duma, asked Putin to recognize the two Russian-backed ‘people’s republics’ as independent states. Putin said he wouldn’t – yet – because he wanted to stick to the Minsk Accords, an agreement on peace in the Donbas that is very unfavorable for Ukraine. He came back to that. Also read this article about the recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk. Of the 450 Duma members, 324 are from the ruling United Russia party.
February 21, 2022 council
The theatrical setting and public humiliation of a security chief did well in social media jokes. That Putin said in advance that the meeting of the National Security Council had not been prepared was not credible. If the aim was to show the council’s agreement with Putin’s decision (recognition of the “people’s republics”), the effect of this play was the opposite. Putin’s sovereignty became clear.
February 21, 2022 thunder speech
The final recognition of the ‘people’s republics’ was accompanied by the announcement of a ‘peace mission’ to protect Russian citizens in the Donbas from alleged ‘genocide’. In an already historic TV speech, Putin ranted at length against the West and Ukraine. In retrospect it was a tryout for his declaration of war on Thursday morning. Everything from that second speech was already in the first: the frustration at the demise of the Soviet Union, the anger at the apostate Ukraine, the loathing of the West.
February 24, 2022 war
Russia attacks Ukraine. Putin uses the request of the independent ‘people’s republics’ as a motive.
A version of this article also appeared in NRC on the morning of February 25, 2022