The Hague, of course, has hardly any influence on the situation in Ukraine. Yet this country has twice landed at the top of The Hague’s agenda in the last thirty years, and in retrospect these were insightful – sometimes embarrassing – moments. The first time, in the 1990s, the then VVD leader Frits Bolkestein caused tension with the first Purple Cabinet (1994-1998) because of his persistent objections to NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe, calling Ukraine “an important buffer state” ‘ for Russia. It was therefore, he wrote in NRCa national interest in rejecting that expansion: “Remember, we will need Russia for many problems.”
Looking sharply in retrospect, although he was unable to convince the House: only GroenLinks supported him at the time. Afterwards, the VVD changed its mind, partly due to the annexation of Crimea and the disaster with MH17. When foreign affairs spokesman Ruben Brekelmans was reminded by Jasper van Dijk (SP) of Bolkestein’s views at the beginning of this month, he implicitly distanced himself from them. Rather liberal ideals than Realpolitik. “A sovereign country,” he said of Ukraine, “must decide for itself whether it focuses on the West or the East.”
That sovereignty also played a (embarrassing) supporting role the second time, in 2016, that Ukraine heavily occupied The Hague: the referendum on the EU association agreement with the country.
It turned into a black page. The helmsmen – the Citizens’ Committee EU, GeenStijl and Thierry Baudet – illustrated everything that is lacking in modern media culture: a sense of spectacle, cynicism and the embrace of (Russian) near-facts.
For example, Baudet claimed in an NRC piece in 2015 that the treaty was “a harbinger” of Ukraine’s EU membership (seven years later, nothing has come of it). And just before voters (32% turnout) rejected the treaty in 2016, the leadership of the EU Citizens’ Committee, which initiated the referendum, gave its cynical take on the matter in NRC: these people were only concerned about their aversion to the EU. “Ukraine doesn’t matter to us, of course.”
The Netherlands later ratified the association agreement in a roundabout way. But the issue of sovereignty continues to play an ambiguous role to this day. Because precisely the two parties, FVD and PVV, who demand that the Netherlands leave the EU to regain its lost sovereignty, are also the parties that, when it comes down to it, do not grant Ukraine sovereignty if this makes Putin angry.
Ukraine also shows how the right wing in national politics has changed: the Realpolitik of the 1990s has now been replaced by inconsistent cynicism.
A version of this article also appeared in NRC on the morning of February 22, 2022