How all the ‘red lines’ around the war in Ukraine are slowly shifting

President Zelensky seized the opportunity with both hands when he videolinked the international political and economic elite in Davos a week ago. address. “Crimea is our country, our territory. It’s our sea, it’s our mountains. Give us weapons, and we will take back what is ours.”

Was a day earlier through The New York Times leaked that the US administration is turning a corner when it comes to facilitating Ukrainian strikes against Russian targets in the Black Sea peninsula, which was already illegally annexed by Russia in 2014. Delivery of long-range missiles, like Western warplanes, has so far been a ‘no gofor Ukraine’s allies.

One such missile candidate, the Army Tactical Missile System (Atacms), has a range of 300 kilometers and can be fired from the Himars launchers that Ukraine already has. But Washington, according to anonymous government officials, also tends to shift this “red line.” As happened this week with modern main battle tanks.

The big question is when the West will cross this next – self-drawn – red line. But without long-range missiles, it is “unthinkable” to drive the Russians from Crimea, says retired Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, commander of US forces in Europe until 2018, when asked. And only when Crimea is liberated can Ukraine regain its freedom, is his conviction. “Crimea is the crucial territory in this war,” Hodges said. “Ukraine will never be safe as long as Russia occupies Crimea.”

Out of Himars range

With the GPS-guided missiles of the US Himars artillery system, which was made available to Kiev last summer, the Ukrainian armed forces said they hit numerous Russian ammunition depots, troop concentrations and important infrastructure in occupied territory, such as bridges. In doing so, they laid the foundations for, among other things, the Russian withdrawal from the city of Kherson in the autumn.

But the vulnerable ammunition stores have since been moved out of Himars reach; that is, further than ninety kilometers from the front line. Like Crimea. “The fact that Crimea is a sanctuary for Russia to kill innocent Ukrainians is due to our unwillingness, until now, to provide weapons that reach beyond 90 kilometers,” Hodges said.

That ‘unwillingness’ is the red line, the concern in the West about becoming directly involved in the war, or fear of a nuclear escalation by Moscow. It prevented Western allies from launching a no fly zone over Ukraine, or supplying the country with F-16s or cruise missiles.

From Himars to main battle tanks and what follows? F-16s

However, that line was gradually shifted in the course of the year. That started with the delivery of Stingers (anti-aircraft missiles) and Javelins (anti-tank missiles) and went through armored howitzers to Himars and Patriot missiles. And from infantry fighting vehicles to modern Western-made tanks.

This gradual Western upscaling follows in part on the American estimate that the danger has diminished that Moscow will deploy a nuclear tactical weapon in retaliation. Some observers believe that the current level of Western military support is only possible because it has been gradually increased.

“The slow roll-out of these weapons to Ukraine over many months has been frustrating, though [voor Kiev] most likely helped prevent a wider conflict between Russia and NATO,” stated Dmitri Alperovicha Moscow-born American, founder of the think tank Silverado Policy Accelerator.

And presumably China plays a role in nuclear risk assessment among Ukraine’s allies: President Xi Jinping informed Russia in November that nuclear escalation is unacceptable. But there is no guarantee that the Kremlin will refrain from using nuclear weapons.

Agreement for delivery

In any case, on Wednesday, the day Washington and Berlin agreed on the supply of tanks, Kiev was already taking the next step. Mychajlo Podoljak, adviser to President Zelensky, said to The Daily Telegraph that the West has already come to “realise” that fears of escalation over the delivery of long-range missiles are misplaced. “We are currently seeing a sharp change in political sentiment in European countries, which understand that they must provide all equipment, including tanks. And I am confident that we will reach an agreement on long-range missiles.”

According to Podoljak, such missiles will be part of the negotiations on a new aid package in the next talks at Ramstein Air Force Base in February. “Only these missiles make it possible to destroy the infrastructure in the rear of the Russian army,” Podoljak said on Wednesday.

Military action in Crimea will only then be feasible, but the supply of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles is an important intermediate step for Ukraine. According to military experts, Crimea will become untenable for the Russians if the peninsula is isolated. This can be done by cutting off the two connecting lines with the mainland: the Crimean bridge near Kerch, which was already attacked in October, and the road and rail connection along Melitopol, a city that was also formerly called ‘the gateway to Crimea’ .

‘The next Ramstein meeting will also be about missiles with a range of 300 kilometers’

Heavy armor from the West can assist Ukraine in an attack on the land link via Melitopol, but Crimea itself can only be hit by air. General Hodges: “For that you need long-range missiles like the Atacms, unmanned Gray Eagle drones, so-called [Ground Launched] Small Diameter Bombs and other precision weapons. This allows you to attack bridges, logistics centers, rail links, troop concentrations, command posts, ammunition stores and larger vulnerable targets in Crimea, such as the Russian naval base at Sevastopol, the military logistics center at Dzjankoy, the air base at Saky. And they will, of course, ensure that the Russians can never rebuild the Crimean Bridge again.”

Ukraine’s allies recognize that the war with Russia is at a crossroads, with major decisions to be made in the course of 2023. There has been little change on the front lines since the recapture of Kherson in November. The Ukrainian army is unable to continue its advance in the Donbas and in the south with its own resources. The arrival of dozens of Western tanks and infantry fighting vehicles later this year will help Ukraine, but defeating Russia will take more.

Read also: From shard vests to Patriots: a year of military support from the Netherlands to Ukraine

Given the recent lack of Ukrainian progress along the frontline, it could take months, but in the end, the position of Crimea, especially politically, will be one of the most difficult issues for Ukraine’s allies. Although it is internationally recognized that the peninsula belongs to Ukraine, Ukrainian reconquest of Crimea remains largely unmentioned.

Among Ukraine’s allies, it is believed that Crimea’s importance, strategically and symbolically, is so great that President Putin would not survive its loss, possibly literally. In other words, Crimea appears to be a red line that cannot be advanced lest potential nuclear escalation be incurred.

Since the annexation in 2014, welcomed in Russia at the time, the area has been covered by Russian nuclear doctrine. It states that nuclear weapons will be deployed as soon as the survival of the Russian federal state is threatened.

Geopolitical confrontation

So said Mark Milley, commander of the US Armed Forces, last week at the Ramstein talks that it will be “very, very difficult” from a military point of view to recapture the entire territory of Ukraine this year – including Crimea.

Nevertheless, Ukraine itself sees opportunities. The hope is partly based on the Russian annexation, last year, of the four Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia and Kherson. “In the last eleven months, Crimea has lost its unique position,” wrote Andriy Zagorodnyuk, former Secretary of Defense, before the Atlantic Council earlier this month. “It has become part of a much larger geopolitical confrontation.”

Ukraine’s Western allies will be weighing all the considerations in the coming months about supporting a Crimean liberation operation. This will mainly focus on whether they want to take the risk of (nuclear) escalation.

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