Even after the Black Death, in 17th-century Amsterdam and during the reconstruction period, there was a great demand for workers. Connoisseurs of those periods give tips on what to do and what not to do in such times.
Lesson 1: wages don’t just go up
In the mid-14th century, the Black Death swept through Europe. Roughly one third of the European population succumbed to this plague wave. As a result, there was still work to be done, in all kinds of industries.
In theory, the surviving workers were therefore financially baked: now that the demand for their work was high, they could demand high wages. That dictates the economic law of supply and demand.
But things went differently, says Jan Dumolyn, a historian at Ghent University who specializes in the Middle Ages: ‘In Flemish cities, for example, the elite took measures to keep wages low. England got the Statute of Labourers.’ Under that stipulation, dating from 1351, wages were to remain at the same level as before the plague wave. In addition, workers were not allowed to just leave to look for better-paying bosses.
‘The law of supply and demand therefore did not apply when it came to labor’, concludes Dumolyn, ‘because the wealthy upper class erected barriers against higher wages. And today the same thing is happening. There are shortages everywhere, but even now there are institutions that hinder wage increases. Meanwhile, large companies and investors are making huge profits.’ A recipe for great social dissatisfaction and problems, says Dumolyn.
In the 14th century, the upper class enforced the low pay with a strict hand, with rules like the Statute of Laborers and by crushing revolts of disgruntled workers. ‘That is no longer possible in today’s democratic society, so spokespersons for asset managers and banks come on TV to say that wages really can’t go up. Because above all, the profits of large companies should not be tampered with.’
Unwise, says Dumolyn, because the more recent past also shows that it makes more economic sense to give up profits in favor of wages: ‘In the fifties, sixties and seventies of the 20th century, profits were proportionally lower and wages higher. . That led to more economic growth. Now the very rich are getting richer and the rest getting poorer. That makes the situation unstable.’
Moreover, if the post-black death situation is exemplary, low wages are unsustainable in the long run. ‘Because even if you have the power,’ says Dumolyn, ‘you can’t force people to work endlessly for little money, especially not when life gets more expensive.’ Just like now, there was considerable inflation in the late Middle Ages.
In the century after the plague pandemic, wages rose gradually, despite efforts to keep them low: ‘The middle class in the cities in particular enjoyed a high wage level in the mid-15th century. We know that because they ate a lot of meat and meat was expensive.’
Whether it will go the same way this time, the historian does not want to predict. But better pay, he says, is the most important solution for anyone who needs employees and wants to keep society pleasant: ‘Just increase those wages.’
Lesson 2: let migrants come and go
A second historical lesson comes from Amsterdam, which experienced enormous growth in the 17th century. The port city needed sailors, maids, and all sorts of workers. Most of these came from outside, says Leo Lucassen, professor of labor and migration history at Leiden University and director of the International Institute of Social History.
Lucassen cites the example of the Dutch East India Company, the VOC. He was in constant need of sailors to man ships: ‘In the 17th and 18th centuries, a total of one million people signed up for the VOC. Not all of them left Amsterdam, but many did.’ Far too few men were born in the city to fill the ships, so half of the people on board came from abroad, for example from Scandinavia and the German Empire.
Lucassen: ‘In order to have enough workers, Amsterdam opted for an open-door policy for newcomers for two centuries. That was possible at the time, because in the 17th century cities decided on such matters. Migration was not a national issue.’
Immigration was essential for the Amsterdam economy, and according to Lucassen there is a parallel with the present and the future of the Netherlands: newcomers are indispensable to meet the demand for labour.
Some of the current inhabitants object to this and want to keep the Netherlands ‘Dutch’. This is not a new phenomenon either: in the 17th century Amsterdam’s open-door policy sometimes led to resentment against newcomers. ‘It just didn’t become a political issue. Amsterdam was not a democracy. The city was governed by an elite of regents who ignored that resentment. So there was no room to mobilize it politically.’
Moreover, newcomers were received differently than at present: ‘Migrants from outside the EU who are allowed to stay here are given rights, for example to benefits. As a result, there is a fear that a flexible migration policy could undermine the welfare state.’ This fear was not an issue in 17th-century Amsterdam, because the social safety net was not much, especially for newcomers. The poorest of the poor could get some help from churches or synagogues, but otherwise migrants were mostly left to their own devices. ‘That could change if you were in town longer and, for example, joined a guild that helped financially in difficult times.’
Perhaps we can learn from that model, says Lucassen: be flexible when people come here, but give them access to social rights gradually and in stages. ‘Then migrants no longer have to risk their lives to cross borders, as is now happening. And they can come and go, depending on the employment.’
The Amsterdam system also had its downsides, Lucassen notes: ‘It turned out particularly well for the wealthy upper class, who could always make people work for them. There was also a large underclass that was poorly paid. People in the 17th century did not find this a problem, because according to them differences were part of life. But we would find the poverty of that time unacceptable now.’ According to Lucassen, the newcomers must therefore be protected against too low wages and exploitation.
Lesson 3: The acquired right of part-time work does not just give up staff
Is there anything to gain from part-time workers? After all, the Dutch are more likely to work part-time than the rest of Europe. And if part-timers work more hours, that can save a sip on a drink, or so it sounds here and there.
But historian Timon de Groot does not expect major changes in that regard. He researched the history of part-time work at Utrecht University, and saw how part-time jobs became a cherished privilege, deeply rooted in the Dutch way of working.
Part-time work was once intended as a solution to a labor shortage, he explains: ‘In the late 1950s and early 1960s, many workers were needed in, for example, nursing. Nursing was then seen as a women’s profession, but there were few women who worked outside the home. This had to do with the breadwinner ideal: it was the norm for men to earn money and women to stay at home, especially if they were married and had children. That ideal had emerged in the course of the 19th century, and was at its peak in the 1950s and 1960s. It was seen as an achievement that women could devote themselves completely to their families.’
In order to solve the ‘women shortage’, as it was then called, careful experiments were made in the 1960s with part-time work. That took some getting used to, for example in hospitals. Full-time work was standard there, because otherwise patients would see new faces all the time. According to the management, that was undesirable.
In addition, regulations stood in the way: ‘Part-time work was seen as a bonus, not as a real job,’ says De Groot. ‘That is why part-time workers earned less per hour than people with a full-time job and did not accrue pension, for example.’
That changed in the 1970s, when retailers were looking for staff and saw part-time women as a solution. ‘At that time, employers’ and employers’ organizations aimed for part-time work to become a fully-fledged alternative to a full-time job, with the same rules.’
By the time those adjustments were made, the job market was turned upside down: in the early 1980s there was no shortage, but a surplus of workers. ‘Then part-time work became a panacea for solving unemployment,’ says De Groot. “Jobs were split up so that two people could do the work instead of one. There was also a reduction in working hours to create more jobs.’
Part-time work thus became firmly anchored, to the satisfaction of many part-timers: ‘It has become an achievement that they will not just give up. In addition, many employees are no longer able to work at all. A quarter of part-time workers are between 15 and 25 years old. These are mainly pupils and students who earn something in the supermarket or the catering industry, and who have to go on to school.’
‘In other sectors, such as healthcare, it can be difficult to get a full-time schedule. Perhaps something can be changed about that, so that part-time work really becomes a choice again, as it was once intended.’
But that is still a long way from solving the shortage of employees, says De Groot, because despite the Dutch preference for part-time work, there are also many sectors in which full-time work is the standard: ‘As in construction, for example, and there is a major deficit. So there’s a lot more going on than part-time work.’