For years, the city of Buenos Aires was the impregnable bastion of the PRO. From the arrival of Mauricio Macri In 2007, going through Horacio Rodríguez Larreta until Jorge Macriwith a well -oiled electoral machinery, the party knew how to arm against national fluctuations. But that cycle is at risk: freedom progresses, by the hand of Manuel Adorni and with the full support of Javier Mileiit imposed in Buenos Aires territory with a boldness that the PRO did not know, it did not want or could not replicate. The defeat was not only electoral. It was symbolic.
“It is a difficult output of the PRO”, Precisely defines the consultant Gabriel Slavinskyone of the most acute voices in the current political analysis. And that difficulty is not reduced to a failed campaign, but to an accumulation of tactical and strategic errors that ended up blurring the party. Many of which today are attributed near Mauricio Macri to the Catalan consultant Antoni Gutiérrez-Rubí, formerly advisor to Sergio Massa and Cristina Kirchner A chain of misguided decisions that ended up emptying their political proposal.
The Buenos Aires ruling faced the contest with a weak narrative, without epic or contrast against the attacks of Larreta and its “smell of pee”. And unlike other elections, this time the PRO failed to embody a promise of the future, nor knew how to capitalize on its management. “The error is not communicational, it is political strategy”, Repeats Slavinsky.“This is not solved with a prettier campaign, more focused”
Meanwhile, the libertarians understood the period sign. “The first success of Lla is determination and audacity“Slavinsky says.”Milei knows that he has to attack, be disruptive, because that was what he sold”In that logic, aggressive discourse, constant confrontation and even institutional abuse were not errors, but part of the product. Milei’s marketing is his own irreverence. That is why he minimized after Sunday’s vote the criticized videos of Deep Fake with AI:” It is very glass, “she snapped at Macri. Where the pro was erred by calculus, milei was successful by intuition.
Manuel Adorni’s campaign, anointed by Casa Rosada as a libertarian candidate, was aggressive, polarizing and determined. The pro, on the other hand, was languid and blurred: by order of the Catalan consultant he was sweetened to a Silvia Lospenatto that appeared fierce from the National Congress. The “good vibes” did not yield fruits. “The PRO campaign was basically sad, victim”Slavinsky points out hard. There was no enthusiasm or mobilization. There was no message. The defense of“ management ”sounded to pretext. And in politics, the electorate punishes indecision.
In parallel, Peronism either managed to articulate a clear alternative. “Hide explicit Peronism [de parte de Santoro] It was not the best strategy”, Says Slavinsky. Warf, in a context of extreme speeches, only serves to become invisible. The defeat of the PRO is hardly the loss of an choice: it is the closure of a cycle and the opening of a reconfiguration stage. The future will be of whom you know how understood.
