Lavrov has ‘some hope’ for a compromise and, according to Zelensky, the negotiations are taking on a ‘more realistic’ character. But the wish for success is far ahead of reality: the war rages on unabated.
The financial markets immediately rebounded on Wednesday, but that may have been a misjudgment of the unruly reality. Estimating the chances of a ceasefire in Ukraine – which must precede a diplomatic solution – requires what Russian units lack on the battlefield: good coordination. Because the dynamics at the negotiating table are directly related to the dynamics on the battlefield. And the temporary stalemate there does not in the least mean that the fighting is over. On the contrary.
Military pundits continue to marvel at the many factors (lack of coordination, motivation and preparation) that contribute to the faltering of the Russian invasion — forcing the generals to bring in new troops and equipment from all corners of the country and beyond. . British war expert Lawrence Freedman speaks of “a pattern of Russian failure to achieve basic military objectives” linked to Ukraine’s willingness to continue wreaking havoc on the Russian military.
The initial failure of the Russian war machine — coupled with unprecedented Western economic pressure on Moscow — may explain Russia’s move toward negotiation. In any case, the Ukrainians believe so. Very recently, Russia denied the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and Ukraine’s right to exist. Now Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov is talking again about the language rights of the ethnic Russians in Ukraine, a population group that is being harassed by Russia in Kharkiv, Mariupol, Mykolayiv and other places. He says he has “some hope” of a compromise.
For his part, Ukrainian President Zelensky says the negotiations are now beginning to take on a “more realistic” character. On Tuesday he showed that he had had enough of NATO’s flapping door. That’s not surprising. Even before the war he talked about the ‘Nato dream’ and the willingness to talk about neutrality. Russia did not agree: it turned out to have set its sights on (much) more, and hoped to achieve this with a military invasion.
Starting points for negotiations
Now Zelensky’s willingness to talk about neutrality and a limited form of demilitarization (which both sides explain very differently, by the way) offers leads to make some progress. There could be talk of a form of neutrality combined with external ‘security guarantees’, and promises could be made about not installing certain military systems in Ukraine that aren’t there now. According to the Financial Times is there a 15-point plan providing for Ukrainian neutrality and Russian withdrawal†
Moscow says it is open to the Swedish or Austrian type of neutrality as a compromise. That is to say: no ‘Finlandisation’, with Moscow keeping a firm grip on the pie. The Ukrainian negotiator (and adviser to Zelensky) Mikhailo Podoljak reacted to this on Wednesday as follows: Ukraine is now at war with Russia. Therefore, it can only be a ‘Ukrainian model’, with ‘absolute’, ‘legally established’ and ‘effective’ security guarantees from other states, and not the ‘Budapest model’ (the political statement issued by four countries in 1994 in exchange for Kyiv giving up nuclear weapons).
That means, he says, that the parties that sign such guarantees “will not, as now, stand aside” if Ukraine is attacked, but will actively defend the country. Ukraine also wants watertight guarantees that the airspace will be closed in the event of a new external attack (a no-fly zone, that Western countries now do not want to enforce).
In reporting on the negotiations, the wish that they will be successful sometimes seems to prejudge reality. President Putin said Tuesday evening in a meeting with Charles Michel of the EU that “Kyiv shows no serious commitment to finding mutually acceptable solutions.” On Russian TV, Putin again spoke of “Nazis” in Kyiv and “genocide” against ethnic Russians on Wednesday.
‘Very confident’ in an imminent ceasefire
Ukrainian negotiator Podoljak told the American TV program on Wednesday PBS News Hour to have ‘high confidence’ in an imminent ceasefire, eventually followed by a talk between Zelensky and Putin, because on the battlefield the Russians are ‘stuck in their positions and have absolutely no chance of moving further into Ukraine’. But the day before, he spoke of a ‘very difficult and malicious negotiation process’ characterized by ‘fundamental contradictions’.
And then neutrality is another subject on which the parties have approached each other, at least in theory to some extent. Bob Deen, Clingendael expert on this region, points out that with other issues – the status of the separatist republics in eastern Ukraine and Crimea – it is much more complicated. ‘The political space for Zelensky to make concessions on that was already small, even if he wanted to. And in general, now that the Ukrainians prove to be able to defend themselves well on the battlefield, they will be less inclined to bend their knees.’
The Russian attacks on civilian targets make that willingness to compromise even less. But that’s mainly because Ukraine, aided by substantial Western, mainly American, arms support (last week worth $1 billion), has so far withstood Russian attacks. Ukraine at this point seems united in the will to survive as a country. That could change depending on how far President Putin is willing to go to virtually eradicate all opposition, for example by further escalating the type of weapons he uses.
The same interaction between battlefield and negotiating table exists in Russia. Russia seems to be tempering its war goals. But how much is Putin’s agenda really shifting under pressure from disappointing first results and Western economic pressure? And if, at this point, Russia is showing flexibility on the issue of ‘neutrality’, how about the separatist ‘people’s republics’ in eastern Ukraine that Russia has just recognized? And in Crimea, the annexation of which in 2014 boosted Putin’s popularity to great heights?
Temporary international management or supervision
In theory, solutions can be found for all these problems, as the settlement of the First World War in the Treaty of Versailles shows, among other things. This could include a form of (temporary) international governance, or local self-government under international supervision. But all of these solutions are likely well beyond the political margins for ending the war that are acceptable to Putin. Any more than acceptance of a Russian Crimea is beyond the political margins of any Ukrainian president.
And even if Crimea is left out of a deal Podoljak alluded to on Wednesday, an almost as big problem will arise with the renegade regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. Russia recognized it as independent before the war. This means that all ‘federal’ solutions within Ukraine that until recently were proposed by Moscow itself (and which would give Moscow influence in Kyiv through these areas) can be thrown into the trash. And here too, formal acceptance of this de facto situation will be unacceptable to Kyiv.
The war has been going on for three weeks now. Hopeful messages about negotiations respond to the wish and need of many that they come to an end quickly. It is, understandably, so great that this alone is enough for both parties to ascribe a ‘constructive role’ to themselves in the face of the global community. But communication about a peace process is different from its actual progress.
As the war rages on unabated, you might therefore better view the near-continuous negotiations — as much as the combat actions — as indicative of where the belligerents now stand in achieving their political goals — goals that may shift with success or setbacks on the battlefield.
As mentioned, the war is three weeks old. But possible Russian war crimes are already being investigated. There are already more than three million refugees. The material damage already exceeds 100 billion euros.
The destruction of infrastructure is enormous
The enormously wide-ranging and far-reaching effects of the war in many areas will not facilitate the resolution of all these thorny issues. An example: the destruction of the Ukrainian infrastructure by the Russians, even in areas that they (probably) want to annex or turn into a puppet state, is unbelievably great. And given the brutal method of conquest, a direct or indirect Russian administration of these areas is no mean feat.
“What kind of peace can Putin afford?” Freedman wonders. Russia’s economy is being brought to its knees by Western sanctions. Conquered areas, if not abandoned by Russia, will remain as devastated as parts of Syria bombed by Russia. They will be worth little more economically unless they fall back to Ukraine, after which they will be rebuilt with Western aid. But to what extent is the current Russian regime guided by such considerations?
Because such enormous interests are involved in the settlement of the war, which go far beyond the battlefield, Western countries will also eventually have to consider their positions towards ending the conflict and towards Russia. Red lines have been crossed by Russia that will make it almost impossible for the West to have a drink afterwards – with the same Putin who now has residential areas bombed – to the good end.
Yet sooner or later the war must end. It is almost inevitable that principles now on the table – war crimes, reparations, territorial integrity of sovereign countries – will be shuffled back and forth like cards in a quartet game. Wars are ugly, their settlement often is.