The Coast Guard is faced with such a shortage of money and personnel that the service cannot be deployed until at least 2027 to protect internet and electricity cables, pipelines and other infrastructure in the North Sea against sabotage and espionage. For example, the department that must analyze suspicious signals is only open during office hours and the control room had only half the required staff – at least in 2024.
The Coast Guard cannot process reports from private parties such as wind farm operators and fishermen who see suspicious activities, but can only “accept and follow through”. The Netherlands therefore runs the risk of missing suspicious ships that may be carrying out espionage or sabotage actions.
This is evident from internal documents of the Coast Guard and the ministries of Infrastructure and Water Management (I&W), from Economic Affairs and from Climate and Green Growth NRC requested invoking the Open Government Act, and out documents that were recently sent to the House of Representatives. NRC asked for documents relating to the so-called North Sea Infrastructure Protection Program (PBNI), which was created by six ministries after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Objective: protect critical infrastructure in the North Sea against sabotage and espionage.
The documents show that the program has barely gotten off the ground for about three years due to wrangling over money. Although the threat according to the intelligence services “remaining strong” is, no ministry wants to allocate structural money for the plans.
Hollowed out
A major bottleneck in the implementation of the plans is the functioning of the Coast Guard, which monitors safety in the North Sea and which, among other things, must assist the police, Customs and Military Police in their work at sea. This service has been eroded to such an extent that it cannot fill its rosters and has halted its work in the field of offshore infrastructure protection in 2023. Although these tasks were limited, the Coast Guard never received any money for them, and due to the dire financial situation, the service could no longer perform them.
Any ambitions for increased security must place “as little burden as possible on the service’s time or capacity” until at least next year, the documents show. The Coast Guard says in response to questions from NRC to have been able to recruit and train people last year, which means that the shortages in the control room are less than in 2024.
Spy drones
The greatly increased threat of sabotage and espionage has only increased the importance of protecting the North Sea. Even before Russia’s invasion of Ukrainewarnedthe National Coordinator for Terrorism and Security (NCTV) that Russia is trying to gain access to vital infrastructure “on a structural basis” in order to disrupt it.
Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, European seas have become a battlefield for hybrid warfare: electricity and internet cables on the seabed were damaged by ships most likely sailing on behalf of Russia or China. Two Nord Stream gas pipelines were blown up, according to German justice, by a group of Ukrainian officers. Ships affiliated with Russia made suspicious movements off the Dutch coast, it was revealed NRC. And cargo ships with Russian crews entered German waters to allow spy drones to take off, according to research by a TV programPointer. The shadow fleet that transports Russian oil despite international sanctions was able to bunker fuel unhindered in the Netherlands, wrote NRC.
At the same time, the Netherlands has become more dependent on infrastructure in the North Sea. In four years’ time, according to I&W, about three-quarters of the electricity consumed nationally will come from the sea. Due to the war in Ukraine, the Netherlands is also relying more on its own oil and gas drilling platforms at sea, according to a 2023 memo from the Coast Guard.
Commander of the Armed Forces Onno Eichelsheim shouted last summerwith European Commissioner Andrius Kubilius (defense) at a conference in The Hague to defend the continent, including at sea. More innovation, investment and collaboration were needed at a rapid pace. “Putin dreams of a divided Europe,” Eichelsheim said, “but we are united in repelling Russia.”
However, practice is difficult, as the released documents show. At least within the Dutch government.
To date, coverage is lacking [voor het PBNI]. We think that’s crazy
Substation for wind farms in the North Sea. The Coast Guard can only “accept and follow through” reports from private parties such as wind farm operators and fishermen who see suspicious activities.
Photo JEROEN JUMELET/anp
Nobody wants to pay
The financial problems already arose when the Rutte IV cabinet created the PBNI in early 2023. Six ministries, including Defense and Economic Affairs, were given the task, together with the Coast Guard, to better protect the vital infrastructure in the North Sea, under the coordination of I&W. No money was allocated for it. “To date, there is no coverage. We think that is strange,” the Inspectorate of National Finances emailed at the end of 2023, more than six months after the program had started.
I&W writes in response to questions from NRC that an action plan and threat analyzes had to be drawn up before an overview of the costs could be made. “Requesting financing without submitting a plan is not possible and that is why PBNI did not receive financing from the start.”
Even when it was clear how much the program would cost, the ministries themselves could or would hardly contribute anything. They asked the Ministry of Finance to finance the program from the general fund. The ministry refused, on the grounds that the cabinet had been outgoing since that summer.
The Ministry of Finance also refused to participate in discussions about the required money, the documents show. That went wrong for Infrastructure & Water Management. It is “not that I&W or another ministry came up with this themselves and that it is anice to have “, an official emailed the Ministry of Finance. “This was taken up at the request of the National Security Council.” The Security Council is a consultation platform of nine ministers, led by the Prime Minister, on security and defense policy.
Only when then Prime Minister Mark Rutte was called in did the outgoing cabinet decide in mid-2024 to release 17 million for that year, and another 25 million for 2025. But these were “incidental contributions.” No department wanted to commit money for the longer term.
That is not enough, officials warned at the time. “Only structural investments can contribute to the continuation of the program,” an I&W official emailed. “Without structural investments, little remains to strengthen the protection of the North Sea infrastructure.”
Without structural investments, little remains to strengthen the protection of the North Sea infrastructure
According to internal notes, 44.2 million per year would be needed from 2025, rising to around 100 million for 2031 and beyond. From 2027, approximately 46 million of these amounts should go to the Coast Guard annually. In response to questions from NRCI&W now writes that around 70 million will be needed annually from 2030.
Responsible minister Mark Harbers (I&W, VVD) wanted to bring it to the House of Representatives in a rather positive way in 2023. In a note about a draft letter to Parliament, he wrote on a Post-it in the margin: “I see that the letter provides less substance than the commitments we made. […] I think the letter could also be written in a much more active and action-oriented manner. […] We must avoid writing a flat letter that gives the House the impression that there is only discussion and investigation.”
Only ‘quick wins’
In reality, little has gotten off the ground in three years, as can be read in the documents – apart from what “quick wins” as the purchase of new cameras and radar systems, and a “testing ground” to improve the threat assessment. If a suspicious ship is spotted, there are too few people or boats to do anything.
The purchase of an additional patrol boat for the Coast Guard was delayed due to financial problems. The Coast Guard board called the problem an “unacceptable scenario” in 2024. The ship will now be put into service in 2026. It is rented from towing company Muller, which also supplies the crew.
The sharing of information between the Coast Guard, Navy, intelligence services, police and Public Prosecution Service is also poor, according to a recent report reportabout protection of the North Sea infrastructure, which was written on behalf of I&W. The Coast Guard has too little information and people to properly analyze suspicious signals. It has happened several times that a signal received by the Coast Guard was only interpreted by intelligence services or the navy a few days later. In the meantime, it was decided on the basis of incomplete information whether and, if so, how to intervene.
This way, dubious ships can go unnoticed. Such as the freighter Ruby, which wandered in the North Sea with technical defects in October 2024. The ship had loaded the explosive ammonium nitrate in Russia – the same substance that exploded in the port of Beirut in 2020, killing 220. “Due to security considerations, this ship is not welcome in several countries,” according to released minutes. But “this information only reached the Coast Guard almost as the last link.”
Eventually the ship found a port in Britain, where some of the cargo was dumped into the sea, and some was transferred to another ship. The Ruby then sailed to Rotterdam. The Coast Guard writes in responseNRC– ask that she already had information about the Ruby before she received a formal notification. “So we kept an eye on this ship,” the spokesperson wrote.
For the time being, there is no solution in sight for the financing problems. Only 5 million euros has been reserved for 2026. Minister Robert Tieman (I&W, BBB) left the House last month knowthat it is up to the new cabinet “to make a decision on the continuation of the North Sea Infrastructure Protection Program.” However, the project group now has oneaction planand a “governance advice” delivered.
The freighter Ruby, which wandered in the North Sea with technical defects in October 2024 and eventually moored in the British port of Great Yarmouth.
Photo Christopher Furlong / Getty Images
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