German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock was the latest German politician to step it up, in an interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine this month. A decision on the Leopard 2 main battle tank, a German weapons system fervently desired by Ukraine that could tip the balance on the battlefield, must be taken up by an international coalition. But, she added: as far as she is concerned, that decision will come as soon as possible. “The pressure on the chancellor is mounting,” the ARD headlined on its website the following day.
Earlier, German Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht, who followed the lead of SPD chair Lars Klingbeil this summer, had already frankly settled the taboo around which Baerbock and Scholz still revolve: it was time for Germany to have a military Führungsrolle played in Europe. No sooner had she finished than every German opinion-maker seemed to be furiously climbing into the pen.
Since the start of the Ukraine war, Germany has struggled with the leading role it must inevitably play as an economic superpower, arms manufacturer and importer of Russian gas for Western Europe. But in recent weeks, advancing insight seems to be cautiously taking hold of policymakers in Berlin, fueled by European pressure, Russian miscalculations, and German policymakers of a less reticent generation.
Ukraine’s battlefield successes, partly thanks to Western weapons, have further contributed to “an opening in the minds of German politicians,” said Rafael Loss of the European Council on Foreign Relations. “Some members of the government are starting to reconsider previously excluded issues, such as supplying tanks.”
Tens of billions
But the German examination of conscience is taking too long for the Ukrainians and has so far been mainly criticized. Promised weapons often arrived too late, too few, or with insufficient ammunition, according to Ukraine. Andrij Melnyk, the Ukrainian ambassador to Berlin who has shown a tormentor of German politics since the start of the war, with ever louder and more cynical calls to do more, tweeted after Lambrecht’s statement that Germany is mainly “doubting and delaying a leadership role.” ‘ plays.
Melnyk is soon relieved by a supposedly more constructive colleague. Because Ukraine seems to realize: we have got Germany moving, now it is important to accelerate. Ukraine, and the great host of Western countries that are urging Germany to act for months, have been taken aback by Russian miscalculations. With each new escalation of the energy war, Germany seems to become more determined.
This month, the German government again took rigorous action to secure Germany’s oil and gas supplies. Last week, Berlin placed the German subsidiary of the Russian state oil company Rosneft under receivership, acquiring control of three large (partially) Russian-owned refineries on German soil. Thursday reported weekly newspaper of the mirror that Berlin is also about to nationalize the German subsidiary of the Russian state gas company Gazprom.
Earlier this week, the government already decided to do so with the gas importer Uniper. This company has been on the brink of collapse for months, because Russia continues to close the tap and Uniper therefore has to buy more and more gas on the extremely expensive daily market. With the acquisition of Uniper, total German state aid for the energy sector reached a whopping 40 billion euros. Days after European Commission President Ursula van der Leyen called on member states to help citizens and protect energy security, this is a strong example of German guideland display.
hard power
The discussion about German leadership almost seems to ignore the fact that Germany is already a leader. Scholz’ predecessor Merkel was more than once proclaimed by her admirers as leader of the free world. During the tough negotiations during the euro crisis, after Germany’s generous ‘we buy das’ refugee policy, as a counterpart to the undemocratic Donald Trump. It was the kind soft power where Germany feels comfortable.
But the Ukraine crisis raises tough questions about exercising hard power, and that makes German policymakers nervous. Germany is “a country so badly damaged by a disastrous ‘Führer’ that the word ‘leadership’ can never be innocently translated into German again,” writes top German diplomat Thomas Bagger in a 2019 essay, about the German government. struggle with the exercise of power.
The German debate about the Leopard 2 tank, which is likely to flare up further in the coming weeks, is therefore actually a discussion about the role that Germany wants to play in Europe, argues the Süddeutsche Zeitung this week. The newspaper wonders what the country should do with the call for German leadership.
‘German military leadership on the continent where the Wehrmacht and the SS committed their crimes now seems not only conceivable, but even desirable. But every time Poland or the Baltic States ask for more military involvement from Germany, the question arises: is that a compliment to a historically rehabilitated and democratic Germany, or is the decisive factor mainly boundless anger towards Russia?’