The image of Nicolas Maduro handcuffed by US forces is not legally wordy, nor does it claim to be. It is, above all, a political fact. And like any high-impact political event, it forces us to abandon the comfort of the manual and look at reality as it is, and not as we would like it to be.
Yes: the capture of Maduro raises serious international legality problems. It violates, at least in formal terms, classical principles such as non-intervention in internal affairs of Statesthe immunity of acting heads of state – although the US finds here the logical argument that Maduro was not the legitimately elected ruler.respect for international due process and the absence of an explicit mandate from a multilateral organization or an international court.
There is no UN Security Council resolution, there is no order from the International Criminal Court, there is no extradition granted. From a regulatory point of view, the procedure is fragile, debatable and attackable. But stopping the analysis there is also a form of denial.
Because he existing multilateralism —not the one idealized in speeches— long ago stopped being a tool to defend democracy and became the favorite refuge of non-democratic regimes. A system designed to arbitrate conflicts between States ended up functioning as a shield of impunity for autocracies that learned to block, delay and neutralize any control mechanism.
The Venezuelan case is the most obscene proof of that failure.
In July 2024the Organization of American States was unable to pass a minimum resolution: ask the Maduro regime to publish the electoral records of a presidential election that, according to multiple observers – and the minutes published by the opposition itself online – had won Edmundo González Urrutia. There was no request for military intervention, nor automatic sanctions, nor ignorance of results: just basic transparency.
The proposal obtained 17 votes in favor. One was missing. Only one. Who blocked that elementary demand? Brazil, Colombia and Mexicowho opted for abstention or directly for absence. They were joined by Bolivia, Honduras and the usual Caribbean bloc aligned with Havana. It was not neutrality: it was political complicity. That day it became clear that the problem was not Maduro. The problem was the regional system willing to look the other way.
Brazil, Colombia and Mexico are not dictatorships. Precisely for this reason his role was more serious. They endorsed, by action or omission, a government that falsified elections, persecuted opponents, closed media and emptied any notion of popular sovereignty of content. They did so in the name of supposed diplomatic prudence that, in reality, only benefited the regime. They did so in accordance with an ideological perspective and political expediency, not in pursuit of “international law.”
There was no surprise with Bolivia or certain Caribbean countries, economically and politically dependent on Cuba for decades. But there was with governments that present themselves as democratic and progressive, and that in practice operate like external guarantors of an autocracy.
That is the central point that many today prefer to avoid: the antidemocratic gene that runs through a good part of the Latin American left. The same one that relativizes elections when he does not win, that denounces “lawfare” selectively and that invokes international law only when it serves to protect his own. That gene is the one that today screams “kidnapping” in the face of Maduro’s capture.
But where was that legal fervor when the Venezuelan regime ignored the popular vote? Where when he imprisoned opponents? Where when he turned the country into a platform for organized crime, drug trafficking and armed networks that operate in the region, including guerrillas active in Colombia with political protection?
Cuban control over Venezuela is not a conspiracy theory: it is an operational fact. Security, intelligence, military training and regional coordination. The same matrix that explains why the regime of Havana he reacts as his own to the fall of Maduro. You are not defending an ally: you are defending a cog in the system. Against this backdrop, the claim for legality rings hollow.
Not because international law doesn’t matter, but because was emptied from within. Because it was turned into an alibi for inaction. Because it is invoked to stop democracies, but never to sanction dictatorships. Maduro’s capture does not inaugurate a dangerous era. Expose one that already exists.
For years it was insisted that everything had to be channeled through multilateral organizations that proved to be unable to enforce their own democratic charters. It was repeated that dialogue was the way, while the regime gained time, repressed and consolidated power. Those who warned that Venezuela was not an internal problem, but rather a problem, were accused of being “exaggerated” or “ideological.” regional destabilization factor. Today, reality imposed itself in the harshest way possible.
It is not an exportable model. It is not a desirable method. But it’s not an accident either. It is the direct result of having tolerated, for too long, authoritarianism hiding behind seals, acronyms and diplomatic communications. Multilateralism did not fail yesterday. He failed when he decided to protect regimes instead of people. What happened with Maduro is not the end of that story: it is the unpaid bill. And that bill, sooner or later, always arrives.
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