The Turkish voters have spoken and suddenly the political landscape on Europe’s southeastern border is very different. Beforehand, opinion polls attributed opposition leader Kemal Kiliçdaroglu almost victory, if not already in the first round, then at least in the final game on May 28. But it is President Recep Tayyip Erdogan who won 49.5 percent of the vote on Sunday (against 44.9 for his rival). Partly in view of the high turnout, he therefore has the majority and therefore a new term up for grabs. The parliamentary majority won his AKP party on Sunday.
Erdogan’s likely victory is very bad news for press freedom, human rights and the Kurdish minority in Turkey. With this result, Turkey’s strongman perpetuates his personal power – exercised in various constitutional roles since 2003 – for five years until in principle 2028. A hard blow to the democratic opposition, which united successfully but underestimated the support for the opponent.
Washington is also unhappy with the outcome. The Americans make no secret of the fact that they would rather lose the fickle Erdogan, a troublesome NATO ally, than get rich. As a presidential candidate, Joe Biden advocated in 2019 that the United States help the Turkish opposition “to tackle and defeat Erdogan”: he should “pay a price” for his authoritarianism.
However, there are also some caveats to note. To begin with, this outcome saves Turkey from the risky scenario of post-election turbulence. Of the kind that the US experienced on January 6, 2021, when the incumbent president, out of loser’s rancor, incited his supporters to a coup – but in a country with weaker democratic institutions. The big question of whether there is still room for a non-violent transfer of power in Turkey after 20 years of Erdogan remains open for the time being. The democratic opposition, which showed great strength and resilience in this campaign, will have a new chance in five years’ time. A lot can happen between now and then.
On another level, a status quo in Ankara saves the European Union a lot of headaches. Turning the page to a new chapter in the relationship takes great willpower, perhaps more than is available. Rejoicing over an opposition victory would quickly give way in Brussels and EU capitals to difficult questions on two themes: EU enlargement and migration.
As for the first, it is convenient for everyone that accession negotiations with Turkey have come to a complete standstill (as Member States noted with no regret in 2018). The deep discomfort about Turkish membership in countries such as France, the Netherlands, Austria or Greece dates back well before the autocratic turn that Erdogan started in 2013. On the basis of reasonable democratic objections, however, you are more firmly in a position to say no than with only ‘Muslim country’, ‘too big’ or ‘no sense anymore’.
Conversely, a new, democratic, pro-EU government in Ankara would force the Union to send positive signals, such as reopening accession talks or visa liberalisation. Especially unpopular in the context of the Russian war, in which she already has her hands full with the promises made to Ukraine, Moldova and the countries of the Western Balkans. Hence an analyst Politics said: “A democratic Turkey is a much more fundamental problem for the EU.”
Secondly, as far as migration is concerned, there will also be a sigh of relief here and there. In March 2016, the EU member states concluded the famous agreement with Erdogan on the reception of more than 3.5 million Syrian refugees. It eased tensions at Europe’s external borders at a time of closed internal borders and concerns about the far right. But in Turkey itself, the deal has lost support in recent years. The social effort is therefore great. In a bad economic situation, the Syrians became scapegoats. The opposition campaigned to send them back, which would jeopardize the EU deal. Erdogan, on the other hand, kept to the agreements (unlike EU member states such as the Netherlands, which accepted fewer asylum seekers for voluntary resettlement than promised).
Finally, Turkey has been balancing between Europe and Russia since Ottoman times. The country may be a difficult NATO ally, but that is precisely how it can – as a strong Black Sea neighbor of both warring parties – mediate in the war. Both Zelensky and Putin value their personal connection to the Turkish president. If he did a miracle at the end of May, Kiliçdaroglu would also build it. Here geostrategic continuity trumps heads or tails of the ballot box.
Luke of Mediator is a political philosopher and historian.
A version of this article also appeared in the May 17, 2023 newspaper.