How Russia Weaved Secret Web of Agents in Ukraine Before Setting One Foot Over Border | War Ukraine and Russia

February 24, 2022. It is the first day of the invasion of Ukraine and Russian troops are advancing immediately to the gate of the former Chernobyl nuclear power plant, an important stop on the road to Kiev. They collide with a unit of 169 members of the Ukrainian National Guard, who are tasked with protecting the building. Two hours later, the nuclear power plant is in Russian hands. No shot was fired.

The swift surrender in Chernobyl contrasts sharply with the dogged resistance shown by Ukrainian troops elsewhere, such as Azovstal’s plant in Mariupol. According to Reuters research, Russia’s success at the nuclear power plant was no accident, but the result of a carefully crafted operation to allow secret agents to infiltrate the Ukrainian state apparatus.

According to several sources with knowledge of the Kremlin’s invasion plans, President Vladimir Putin’s advisers believed that thanks to that network of agents, they would need only a few days and a small number of troops to oust President Volodymyr Zelensky from power.

They also confirmed information from Western intelligence that Russia wanted to put former pro-Russian MP Oleg Tsaryov at the head of a puppet government in Kiev. But it didn’t get that far. According to Russian and Ukrainian sources, the secret agents failed in their mission, partly because they exaggerated their influence and told their bosses what they wanted to hear. According to Oleksiy Danilov of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, they also wrongly viewed Ukraine as “weak”.

The tactics worked in Chernobyl. One of the causes is the entanglement of the nuclear power plant with the Russian espionage apparatus. After the nuclear disaster in 1986, the KGB helped clear the site and, according to an internal memo, then-KGB chief Viktor Chebrikov ordered his troops to recruit agents among the staff. Even after Ukraine’s independence in 1991, Russian spies would have remained powerful. At least three investigations into suspicious staff members are currently underway.

One of them is the head of security at the nuclear power plant, Valentin Viter. He is in jail on suspicion of high treason and unlawfully leaving his post. He called in sick six days before the invasion. He himself stated that on the day of the invasion he had telephone contact with the chief of the unit guarding the site and said “not to endanger the lives of his men”.

The Ukrainian State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) is also investigating whether the National Guard made a mistake by laying down its weapons when the Russians were at the gate. The National Guard itself defends itself by pointing out the risks of armed conflict at a nuclear site.

Former top executive of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) Andriy Naumov is also suspected of treason and passing on secret information about Chernobyl. He disappeared just before the invasion and turned up in Serbia in June, according to local police in a car full of cash and emeralds.

It should be clear from these examples that the Russian infiltration also succeeded in another goal: to sow mistrust and paranoia in the Ukrainian state apparatus. Witness is also the video that President Zelensky posted two weeks ago in which he reported that he was suspending the head of his Security Service (SBU) because many of his staff were suspected of treason. Ivan Bakanov would also have been unavailable for several days after the Russian invasion, causing chaos in Kiev.

The National Police in Ukraine has also arrested more than 1,000 people suspected of sabotage and passing on information to Russia, according to the Interior Ministry.