Since the announcement of The Hague as the location of the NATO top, the Netherlands is in a state of readiness. It is an international meeting of a size that the Netherlands is unknown. Even the Nuclear Security Summit in 2014 was of more limited size.
We speculate on it: what will Trump be written on Truth Social, who is at the king’s dis there, and can the Ukrainian president Zensky come? We do grumbling about closed motorways, postponing sports and social events and limited police capacity elsewhere in the country. And we are also proud a bit. At a Dutch Secretary-General who owned 32 allies, it seems to be moving to the finish line: a new agreement on defense spending with which the Americans in stay, and the Russians out.
Because there is quite a bit at stake. With a war on the European Continent, Russian aggression towards former Soviet States, and an increase in sabotage, espionage and digital risks, it is unsafe in Europe. New defense plans require investments. And there are questions about American involvement in Europe. The US wants to reduce it: since President Obama has been labeling the Americans China and the Indo-Pacific region-not Europe-as a abroad priority number one.
Equivalent
Count on years of disinvestments of European allies, multiply all this with the unpredictability of the current American leadership, and you understand that Europe, together with Canada, will have to take on a larger part of the burden within NATO. To be and stay safe yourself – and with the welcome side effect that the safety relationship between Europe and the US is now mainly characterized by dependence.
Yet the NATO summit is, no matter how important, especially an intermediate station, and not a final stop. That has everything to do with decisions that will be made after the top, and that are at least as decisive for the future of the transatlantic bond and safety in Europe as the top itself.
First: are the agreements made respected, and how does NATO keep the pressure on the boiler? A new NATO standard for defense spending is not enforceable, and success depends on the willingness of countries to take serious steps, despite the painful political choices that accompany it.
The timeline that is agreed determines how quickly countries are deemed to show progress. To keep the speed in it, the NATO secretary-general leans on persuasiveness and pearamong other things with the help of the four -year planning cycle of NATO and the associated ‘country exams’, and other times when countries that do not deliver are put in their shirts: the regular meetings of Foreign Ministers and Defense and annual tops. The growing threat based on Russia must be the most important incentive to respect the agreed timeline. That the Americans want to see rapid progress as a condition for their own involvement in the alliance is an extra stick.
Filling gaps
And then there are questions about the American military deployment in Europe. The Global Force Posture Reviewabout the use of American troops and equipment, should appear this fall. It is possible that, of the approximately 100,000 American soldiers stationed in Europe, a part will be withdrawn in favor of American deployment in Asia. It is uncertain whether it will stay with the 20,000 American soldiers who have been added to Europe after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, or whether more will be stationed elsewhere. It is clear that Europe and Canada will have to fill the gaps that the Americans leave behind, and have to free up extra resources on top of the agreements made at the NATO top.
Unity determines the deterrent power of NATO
Finally, the course of Russia’s war in Ukraine, and American involvement, is decisive. It is already clear that the Trump government has little sense in further military support for Ukraine; Nothing is included in the current plans of the Pentagon. Donald Trump still hopes for a peace deal with Russia, but the irritation in Washington about the absence of a serious reaction on the Russian side is increasing.
The conversation on Capitol Hill is about a large -scale sanction package, with substantial import duties for countries that keep buying Russian oil and gas. The White House still has to confess color, and so far has in the middle, whether and in what form it supports the plans that the congress has been put on the table. But whatever line the executive power chooses: it is clear that Europe will have to do more in the near future to maintain Ukraine. Here too, the new NATO standard offers no relief.
Historical Appointment
A NATO summit is a success when countries come out together and the unity is preserved. After all, that unity determines the credibility of the alliance and the associated deterrent. In this area the top seems to be supplying: with a historical agreement to increase national defense budgets and an impetus for a new distribution of the burden within the alliance.
However, much depends on the period after. From the willingness of European allies to translate the new standard into concrete defense plans and budgets. Of decisions regarding the US force and broader use of the US in Europe. And from the way in which the US government decides to relate to Ukraine and Russia. So although the task of the Netherlands as a host country will soon be over, with a widely supported new course as a result, it will only be really exciting after the top.
Read also
How strong is a coalition of cheated allies?
