What does Beijing say about Ukraine and Russia?
Not much. The Chinese discomfort surrounding this crisis is reflected in vague platitudes about a diplomatic solution. While Chinese diplomats still called the Minsk peace accords ‘the only way out’, Putin had already dumped them in the garbage.
Beijing supports Putin in his opposition to NATO expansion, but that does not mean that China is simply sacrificing Ukraine, a main supplier of corn, wheat and warplanes. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said on Saturday that Ukraine should not be a front, but “a connecting bridge between east and west,” a reference to Chinese freight railways to Europe that run through Ukraine.
Why is China against war in Ukraine?
China is averse to anything that harms world trade, such as war in a country where China had already invested about 150 million dollars at the end of 2019.
Territorial integrity has always been sacred in China’s foreign policy, due to the presence of rebellious peoples within China’s borders, who are striving for statehood. China invariably uses the defense of its territorial integrity as an argument to nibble at other people’s borders, for example on the issue of Taiwan and border disputes with India, Bhutan, Japan and in the South China Sea. If others play the same game, China is against it on principle; hence Beijing failed to recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.
Is China Helping Russia Resist Western Sanctions?
Beijing is already doing this by buying large amounts of gas that are settled in Chinese renminbi instead of dollars. These energy transactions are thus exempt from financial sanctions. With Chinese gas deals worth $117 billion, stopping Nord Stream 2 will hit Putin less hard.
However, opportunities to take advantage of increasing Russian economic dependence are limited, as Chinese banks do not want to be cut off from the international financial system. Washington is already warning that China cannot lead Russia through the crisis with impunity.
This is not a boast: unlike the EU and the United Kingdom, the US can also impose secondary sanctions on third parties who circumvent US sanctions. And there are already so many US sanctions on China that Beijing doesn’t need any more.
What’s next for the informal alliance between Xi and Putin?
Three weeks ago, this authoritarian bloc against the West seemed to have only advantages. Now the drawbacks emerge, a little too fast for Xi’s taste.
Brussels, for example, suddenly lumped China together with Russia in unprecedented harsh terms. “They prefer the law of the fittest to the rule of law, intimidation over self-determination, coercion over cooperation,” said European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. That sounds as if Xi can forget about improving the deeply troubled relations with the EU for the time being.
Whether it is an advantage that Washington is now distracted and the US does not get around to rivalry with China remains to be seen. In fact, the threat of war in Ukraine is fueling increased international vigilance over Xi’s ambition with Taiwan, which he hopes to bring as a renegade province under Chinese control. As many as three heads of government at the same time – in London, Tokyo and Canberra – pointed out on Wednesday the danger that Beijing will trespass on Taiwan if Putin easily gets away with his aggression against Ukraine. Taiwan is certainly not getting less attention because of Putin’s actions.
This is not to the liking of Xi, who prefers to approach international politics as a buffet where he can enjoy unlimited dishes without having to choose between Russian caviar, American lobster, Ukrainian corn on the cob or European chocolates. Xi is likely now wondering whether his pact with Putin is a brilliant long-term strategy or a tactical miscalculation. Until that judgment has been passed, his ministers will keep quiet for the sake of safety.