The recent economic history of Argentina has a disturbing feature: the same technicians who led its worst crises are once again occupying positions of power and systematically applying the same recipes that have already proven not to work. The result, invariably, is paid by the same sectors as always.
The first of the duo is Federico Sturzenegger, who has participated in three governments from 1999 to the present, with a record of setbacks that worsens with each new administration. Between 1999 and 2001 he was responsible for the Mega Exchange with private bondholders and the Shielding with international organizations, two operations that, far from stabilizing the economy, contributed to the default of 2001, with its tragic and well-known social consequences. In his second appearance, between 2016 and 2019, he conducted monetary policy, taking the rates of the LEBACs from the 38% per year that he received to 92%, and then replacing them with the LELIQs, which at the time of his departure in 2018 were already at 85% per year. The accumulated CPI that year was 48.7%, doubling the 24.8% registered in 2017.
Starting in 2016, he was joined by Luis Caputo, who in his role as head of public finances placed debt in international markets for approximately $130 billion in Argentine bonds until December 2017. Starting on January 18, 2018, market conditions deteriorated to the point that Argentine companies were unable to issue new bonds or negotiable obligations, with Telecom Argentina being one of the first affected by that closure. credit abrupt.
Acting together, both officials signed two agreements with the IMF in May and August 2018, for $35 billion and $57.8 billion respectively. In September of that same year, they placed 11 tons of gold as collateral for a short-term loan for $500 million, maturing in March 2019. By then, neither of the two remained in the government, the payment was not made and the gold given as collateral was lost.
The INDEC installed capacity data allows an eloquent comparison. In February 2018, after two full years of that management, the utilization of installed capacity was 64.4%, and it closed that December at 56.6%. In December 2019 it stood at 56.9%, and in October 2020—now emerging from the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic—it rebounded to 61.8%. The most recent data available, corresponding to February 2026, two full years after the return of both officials to power, marks just 54.6%. The comparison between February 2018 and 2026 is methodologically valid because in both cases it represents the end of the second year of management: the installed capacity is lower today than at that reference point. When the same diagnoses and the same solutions are applied, the results tend to be repeated. The unrestricted opening of imports in the automotive and textile sectors affected them especially severely in both periods, generating a significant volume of unemployment on each occasion.
It is worth remembering that in 2020 the government that took office in December 2019 had to restructure an external debt that had grown from 100,000 to 235,000 million dollars, achieving a reduction of close to 65,000 million dollars through negotiation with private bondholders and the IMF.
In December 2023, the duo resumed their influence over economic policy and the country once again became indebted to the International Monetary Fund, although the agreement did not receive formal approval from the National Congress: the Decree of Necessity and Urgency enabled was, according to its own text, only to begin negotiations, so legally it would not constitute legal debt of the Argentine State. In this context, the 11 tons of gold acquired in 2021 also left the country to replace those lost in 2019, without their destination having been precisely reported, which would constitute, according to the analysis of specialists, a possible misappropriation of public funds.
Added to this is that customs controls on exports are being exercised, in practice, by the exporting companies themselves, without external supervision over the content of the containers, which would enable an estimated under-invoicing of around 30 billion dollars annually in the settlement of foreign currency.
At the institutional level, the bond between both technicians is going through its worst moment today. When Sturzenegger was offered the Chief of the Cabinet of Ministers, Caputo confirmed that, if that appointment was made, he would abandon his role. Simultaneously, one promoted legislation that would seek to withdraw funds from the Municipal Advance Fund, while the other promotes the elimination of the Household Expenditure Survey, an essential statistical tool whose disappearance would leave the consumer price index without methodological support and, under the regime of the Bases Law, would deprive the agents covered by Resolution 48 of employment and place permanent staff on availability.
The question that remains open is not new, but it is increasingly urgent: how long can a society allow those who designed its most serious crises to once again have the levers of the economy in their hands?
Fabián Medina — Economic and Tax Analyst
