In fact, it was never a question of whether the Houthis would join the fray in the Middle East. How and when they would do this remained a subject of speculation among analysts. Clarity came on Saturday morning when the Yemeni militia fired at least one rocket at Israel. There were no casualties.
How were observers so sure that the Houthis would not remain on the sidelines? Firstly, because the group has been warning lately that they had “their finger on the trigger.” Secondly, because the Houthis are part of the so-called ‘Axis of Resistance’: a loose alliance of Iranian allies in the region that has been armed by Tehran in recent decades, always with a view to a possible existential conflict with Israel.
That conflict, which started with the Israeli-American attacks, has now been going on for four weeks. And while Axis of Resistance members such as Shiite militias in Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon have long been firing rockets into Israel in response to Israeli violence, the Houthis have so far remained conspicuously aloof.
Why only now?
Why are the Houthis – who have occupied more than a third of Yemen for years – only now choosing to take up arms? What plays a role is that the group is more or less Iran’s last remaining serious supporter, said Yemen expert Nadwa al-Dawsari, affiliated with the American Middle Eastern Institute (MAY), earlier this month in the podcast of the MAY. Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon have been seriously weakened by their war with Israel over the past two years.
Attachés of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards play an important role in the Houthis’ internal decision-making, Al-Dawsari said in the podcast. “It is the Iranian Revolutionary Guard that is leading the attacks by Houthis across the border locally in Yemen.”
According to Al-Dawsari, there has been disagreement over the appropriate timing of attacks in recent weeks not only between the Houthis and their Iranian advisors, but also within the ranks of the Iranian commanders themselves. “Some wanted to get involved in the war as quickly as possible, others wanted to keep the Houthis as a wild card for later war.”
The timing may therefore simply be the result of the fact that this internal discussion has only now been resolved. Or perhaps Tehran wants to increase the pressure on Washington and Tel Aviv now that US President Donald Trump says negotiations are underway with Iran – something Iran itself still denies.
Escalation ladder
In a sense, the rocket attack on Israel is only the first step on the escalation ladder. The Houthis have also regularly bombarded Israel with rockets and drones since the start of the war in Gaza almost two and a half years ago. Israeli anti-aircraft systems managed to repel most of the attacks.
To escalate, the Houthis could also make efforts to block shipping traffic in the Red Sea. They also did this several times in the past two years in solidarity with the Palestinians in Gaza. The group managed to sink several ships.
This forced merchant ships to avoid the Red Sea – a major trade route – entirely and instead sail around the African continent and the Cape of Good Hope, a massive detour that easily adds four thousand miles and at least ten days of sailing time to a voyage. The costs for international container transport between Asia and Europe quadrupled.
Now more than ever, the Houthis could do far-reaching damage to the global economy. In response to the American-Israeli offensive, Iran is blocking the other important strait in the region: the Strait of Hormuz. Before the war, this sea passage, on the other side of the peninsula, was the transit route for about twenty million oil barrels per day, about 20 percent of global oil transport.
In an attempt to get their oil out of the region, Saudis have been working hard for weeks on an alternative route, overland. This has been working well so far: Riyadh managed to increase the capacity of the existing East-West pipeline to such an extent that it was able to transport up to five million barrels per day last week.
However, this pipeline ends at the Saudi port city of Yanbu, on the Red Sea. With some targeted attacks on oil tankers from the south, the Houthis could completely dry up the flow of oil from the region. And that could have major consequences for the rapidly rising price of oil worldwide.
Balancing act
The militia could also attack the Saudi oil infrastructure itself, although Yemen expert al-Dawsari called this less likely. The Houthis want to prevent large-scale Saudi military reprisals.
In that regard, the Houthis are balancing on a tightrope. The militia has experience with the consequences of their military intervention. They have already suffered serious blows in the past two years, due to waves of American attacks following their attacks on shipping traffic in the Red Sea. A large number of their commanders were killed.
At the same time, the American bombings did not immediately lead to the reopening of the Red Sea. The situation resembles the current American powerlessness in the face of the Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
Last year, Trump was ultimately forced to negotiate with the Houthis about allowing ships to pass again. “We took a big hit on them,” Trump said at the time, but he also seemed impressed by his opponents. “But they had an enormous ability to roll with the punches.”
