In the White House, in front of the lunch shared with Javier Milei, Donald Trump did what he does best: turn diplomacy into a spectacle. “We are going to help Argentina stabilize its economy,” he said, hinting at an aid package that, according to sources in Washington, could include financing lines and a swap of foreign exchange for up to 20 billion dollars. What seemed like a political phrase became a concrete signal of support for the most audacious—and also risky—economic program in Latin America. The same speech came with a warning: the money would arrive after the midterm elections and was conditional on the result, something that the US president and his Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessent, later corrected with posts in X.
The gesture did not go unnoticed. Just hours later, Gita Gopinath, former number two at the International Monetary Fund and one of the most influential voices in the global financial establishment, wrote on her X account: “I totally agree with Ricardo Hausmann. His article in The New York Times He says it perfectly,” and cited a passage that warned that “Argentines must reach a political consensus around stability, not as a partisan slogan but as a foundation for growth.” In other words: money does not replace trust; it only accompanies it if there is a clear direction.
The convergence between Trump and Gopinath is paradoxical. While the former North American president sees in Milei an ideological ally who embodies his crusade against “global statism,” the IMF economist represents the technical prudence that seeks to shield stability from political whims. Both agree on something essential: Argentina needs to break its old habits and demonstrate that it can sustain a coherent economic policy, without returning to the cycle of deficit, inflation and devaluation that has periodically sunk it for decades. In Bessent’s words: “Peronism.”
Trump, pragmatist and opportunist, interprets financial support as a strategic move. His government is trying to project influence in Latin America at a time when China and Russia are expanding their regional presence. Argentina, with its natural resources, its geopolitical position and its energy potential, is a coveted asset. Backing Milei means offering a symbolic counterweight to Beijing and Moscow, and at the same time sending a signal to the markets: the era of “Latin American populism” could have a new adversary with the seal of the White House.
But political enthusiasm collides with a harsher reality. Gopinath—and the IMF and the Treasury of course—know that no external aid is sustainable if there is no internal consistency. The organization has already praised the progress of the Milei plan, but warns about the social risks of a prolonged adjustment without buffers: those that today generate electoral setbacks for the libertarians, with September 7 in Buenos Aires as a warning.
During her visit to Buenos Aires in 2024, the official was clear: Argentina must maintain a predictable monetary and exchange rate policy, accumulate reserves and distribute the costs of adjustment equitably. These conditions, implicit in each negotiation, are the ones that return to the scene today.
The dilemma, then, is not whether the United States can help Argentina, but under what conditions. An injection of dollars without credible reforms would only serve to buy time: the 20 billion could last just a semester.
Assistance tied to fiscal commitments, institutional transparency and political consensus could, instead, act as an anchor of credibility. But the latter requires something that Argentine history rarely offered: continuity.
In Washington they know it. That is why the Hausmann article that Gopinath cited places the emphasis on the psychology of the country: the challenge is no longer technical, but cultural. Can a society that associates adjustment with punishment and spending with justice reinvent itself around stability?
Trump and Milei seem to think so. Their common discourse is that of patriotic sacrifice: “We will do whatever it takes,” Bessent wrote in X, with control of the American wallet. But “whatever it takes” has another reading in the markets: it means that the rules of the game must endure even when the political costs are high. That is the point that Gopinath makes: stability is not a slogan, but a structure that is built with institutions, agreements and fiscal discipline (Milei only considers the latter)
On October 26, when Argentines vote in the legislative elections, they will be defining more than just a distribution of seats. They will be sending a signal to themselves and the world about whether the country is willing to anchor its future in a real commitment to stability. US support—whether through the IMF or a bilateral line—will depend on that response.
Because outside help is not a reward; It is a vote of confidence. And that vote, in the language of the markets, is won with facts: fiscal balance, realistic exchange rate, accumulation of reserves and political governability.
If Milei manages to sustain that combination, international support could become the turning point that Argentina has been pursuing for half a century. If not, it will be just another episode of the eternal return of Argentine instability: dollars that come and go, promises that are diluted and a country that begins again.
