After the defeat of Javier Milei in the province of Buenos Aires, Mauricio Macri seemed to opt for a low record. There were no statements or photos in bunkers; According to its environment, “you do not feel part” of the process that ended in the Buenos Aires stumbling. The movement returns it to a low exposure zone from which it seeks to keep margin inside and outside.
On September 2, five days before voting, he had already left signs of distance: he congratulated Juan Pablo Valdés, elected governor of Corrientes and brother of the current provincial president, Gustavo, after defeating Milei’s candidate and, that same day, he ordered the departure of Damián Arabia and Pablo Walter of partisan functions for his alignment with the ruling party.
In parallel, Macri traveled to Denmark to play the Bridge World Cup, in the final stretch of the contest; He was eliminated in the first round and returned, while the campaign was nationalized without his figure and the caravan of Milei lived episodes of tension. He ran from the territory, avoided acts, photos and definitions, and delegated the operation at the Pro Provincial Table. It was not disinterest, but calculation. Be close enough to influence whether the result accompanied; Far enough not to pay the account if it went wrong.
There were also gestures that fed political readings. On Wednesday 10 in the morning, in Tabac, Macri met with his cousin Ángelo Calcaterra and, when he retired, he greeted Horacio Rodríguez Larreta, sitting at another table. The scene surprised by the previous crosses and was read as an open bridge in an adverse context for the government. That same night, in TN, Patricia Bullrich left a message inward: “It would be good to talk to Macri” and “if an alliance was made, it would be good for that to be seen, show it.” Translated: The low profile begins to bother even among those who endorsed the covenant with La Libertad advances.
After 7s, Macri deepened the same libretto: public silence, outsourced spokesperson and a self -exculpation story (“they did not integrate us”, “they did not listen”). It is the doctrine of the plausible denial: authorizes the play, but if the board turns, the leadership for the photo is from others. For the Casa Rosada, the sequence was a series of bad signs: neither called a public, nor containment, nor a shared scene that would lower the foam; Only distance and caution, plus the tobac postcard and the subtle pressure of Bullrich to “show” the alliance.
Near Macri they defend, however, the decision to have played within the alliance with Milei as a positive point. They claim that, having gone outside, today they would accuse him of fragmenting the non -Peronist vote and being functional to the PJ. With a polarized choice, the pro would have been third and with minimal chances of adding benches; Within the pact, on the other hand, he retained a quota of power – men’s but real – in the Legislature and the Buenos Aires Senate. The argument explains its prudence, but also illuminates its omission: the priority was to protect the PRO brand rather than assume costs for the result.
What is coming. Can you anticipate what you will do until October? Probably, controlled ambiguity: low profile, no photo that chains it to an unpopular course, and the alliance in autopilot so as not to load with the break. In parallel, it will work the day after: a minimum program, names with trade and an opposition perimeter wider than the current one. If the government is going wrong, it will claim the credit of the warning; If it survives, it will renegotiate positions taking advantage of the scarcity of others.
What do they expect from him in the Pro? Driving. The agreements – which negotiated society – ask not to disallow the strategy before voting and contain damage; They remember that, even with defeat, most of the benches at stake was retained. Autonomists claim to make differences already and prepare a relaunch on October 27. Macri owes a road map. Until now manages the suspense: summons little, listen in private and let signal signals.
Three scripts circulate on his future role. One places it as a great elector in the shadows if the government opens the door to real changes. Another imagines him as an architect of postmileism, articulating the PRO, federal radicals and Peronism no K in a governance program. The third – less plausible – proposes a step to the side to enable the replacement. His career suggests another preference: influence without exposure, centrality without signature, control without risk.
