However absurd the idea that the United States Buy Greenland, is not an isolated occurrence or a Trump -style occurrence. Since in 2019 the then US president publicly raised the possibility of acquiring the largest island in the world, awakening immediate rejection in Copenhagen and teasing in the European press, the Republican Administration has maintained that interest with a mixture of strategic insistence and aggressive rhetoric.
Today, with Donald Trump again in the White House and his vice president, JD Vance, making symbolically loaded visits to the Pituffik Space Base (former Thule), the message is clear: the will to Annexar Greenland is still standing. And if the Danes are not willing to negotiate, the plan could climb. “The people of Greenland have been careless,” Vance said during his visit to the north of the island, at a press conference that Copenhagen and Nuuk considered directly provocative. “Denmark has not invested enough in its people or in the security of this incredible and strategic land.”
The tone, more than a diplomat, was openly accusatory, and Danish Chancellor, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, replied with a phrase that defines the spirit of the clash: “This is not the language with which near allies are spoken.” The Prime Minister, Mette Frederiksen, was more forceful: “The United States pressure on Greenland is unacceptable and we will resist it.”
Background
Washington’s interest is not new. Already in 1946, President Harry Truman offered 100 million dollars for Greenland. Denmark rejected the offer, but agreed to allow the installation of an American air base in Thule, today renowned Pituffik. This base, key during the Cold War remains essential in the Pentagon’s antimisile defense scheme, not only because of its geographical position between America and Eurasia, but for its proximity to the Arctic, a region increasingly coveted by its energy potential, its emerging navigation routes and its military value.
What was previously a remote area covered with eternal ice, today is a geopolitical board in dispute. The progressive thaw of the Arctic has opened a silent career between powers. Russia has militarized parts of its polar border, China has declared an “almost arctic nation” and has invested in infrastructure in Greenland and Canada, and the United States – struggle but alert – seeks to rebalance its presence. The annexation of Greenland, under this prism, ceases to seem a Trumpist eccentricity to become a strategic play: natural resources (rare minerals, gas, oil), air and maritime surveillance, control over new commercial routes and shielding against rivals.
On sale
JD Vance does not hide that logic. During his visit, he said that “international security demands that Greenland be under American control.” He added, without much subtlety, that if Denmark or the European Union do not understand this need, “we will have to explain it.” Although he clarified later than the use of the force “it will not be necessary,” the veiled threat was floating. He even alluded to a possible “Trump” style negotiation to close a “beneficial treatment” with the Greenlandes, suggesting that it would be enough to appeal to the “rationalism” of its population.
But that reading ignores a key fact: Greenland is not for sale. The island, although it is part of the kingdom of Denmark, has a high degree of autonomy since 2009. Its Parliament (Inatsisartut) manages almost all internal matters, except foreign policy and defense, which are still in the hands of Copenhagen. Even so, the rejection of the American project is unanimous among the five main Greenlands parties, which firmly defend the route towards progressive independence. None of them, not even the most pragmatic, is willing to exchange Danish guardianship – based on historical, linguistic and administrative ties – for a subordination relationship with Washington.
Vance’s visit also unified a political system that is usually fragmented. Hours before their arrival, Greenlandic leaders announced an unprecedented national unity coalition between four of the five games, with an unequivocal message: “Greenland belongs to us.”
Rejection
The new prime minister, Jens-Frederik Nielsen, summed it up like this: “Only if we put aside our differences we will be able to resist the enormous external pressure to which we are subjected.” Denmark, meanwhile, has begun to strengthen its military and technological presence in the region. In January, he announced an investment of 1.5 billion pounds to reinforce its infrastructure in the North Arctic and Atlantic, with new ships, radars and surveillance systems.
The message is double: it is not only about protecting Greenland, but about marking territory against US, Russian and Chinese ambitions. In this new polar board, Copenhagen understands that his role as a regional power goes through assuming an active defense of his kingdom in all its dimensions, including the symbolic.
The Greenland case highlights a broader trend: the foreign policy of the Trump administration (and its possible return) is increasingly marked by an aggressive unilateralism, which seeks to redefine international relations under the prism of strategic convenience. The idea that a nation can appropriate another on behalf of its “security” resurrects old imperial ghosts, covered with modern speeches about global stability and leadership. The fact that the possibility of using force against an ally is hinted at the NATO framework is an alarm signal for Europe.
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