Has the Netherlands been naive with regard to the Russian strategy to become dominant in the European energy supply? Around the time of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, more than a year ago, it became apparent in practice how much many European countries had made themselves dependent on Russian gas. The fingers mainly pointed to Germany, which has been tied to mother Russia by an umbilical cord since the Nord Stream pipeline, to be followed later by Nord Stream 2, was put into operation. The Kremlin wanted to exploit that dependence to dampen the European response to the war in Ukraine.
Since then, things have turned out differently than President Putin must have envisioned. Europe managed to arrange alternative gas supply lines surprisingly quickly. But not without costs. Temporarily, old, more polluting energy sources such as coal and lignite had to be used at the expense of the climate. Given the global energy run, gas, especially the liquid and ship-portable variant, was very expensive to buy. And the cut-off of Russian supply caused high inflation and serious economic damage that is only now beginning to diminish, but the scars of which will remain visible for a long time: a permanent loss of purchasing power and prosperity.
The price for dependence on Russian gas has therefore been high. Not only in euros, but also politically and humanitarianly. Putin’s perception that he could get away with his raid because of Europe’s dependence on his gas will have significantly lowered the barrier to launching his “special military operation” in Ukraine.
Not only the German energy policy towards Russia has contributed to this. The Netherlands is certainly not exempt from this. Last week, NRC published a shocking account of Dutch-Russian relations since Putin took office in 2000. It shows that the very far-reaching cooperation with Russia in the energy sector since then has opened the door wide to infiltration and espionage. The Dutch intelligence services, who issued structural warnings about this, were not or insufficiently listened to by the Balkenende and Rutte cabinets. The ambitions were too great. The Netherlands had to become a hub for the distribution of gas in Europe and essentially allowed Russia to gain control over it. It did not stop there: energy, politics, nanotechnology, culture and governance, diplomacy and energy transport became vulnerable to Russian espionage, the nature and extent of which have not yet been fully mapped out to this day.
You will now have to live with the consequences of this. But apart from identifying, exposing, evaluating and processing, there is also a need to learn. Naiveté was perhaps not the best characterization of Dutch behavior in this case. Opportunism seems a better denominator. The recent history of the Netherlands and Russia seems to be one of a small country that operates tactically, while its large counterpart thinks strategically. As things stand now, Russia, and especially President Putin, appears to be less good at this than previously thought. The invasion of Ukraine appears to be a gross miscalculation.
The world has changed considerably in the meantime. There is always spying – also between allies. But until recently, there was indeed an international order based on law and rules. With rules that everyone did not always adhere to, but which were known and accepted. Now that that order is rapidly eroding and international organizations, for example, are losing power and control, the game is getting rougher.
The recent operation of Putin’s Russia is not only an example of this, but perhaps also a harbinger of it. China is a bigger and more powerful opponent with a very long-term strategy. It should not be the case that a story will be written ten years from now showing that The Hague has once again let itself be wrapped up in a similar way. The Netherlands may be too small for the much bigger game that will soon be played, and which is already in its initial phase. The answer lies here in Europe, which is big enough to make a fist. More and deeper integration is the way to prevent the EU Member States from playing off each other. For Dutch naivety, whether or not disguised as a merchant’s mind, the margins of error have become too small and the world has become too big. From now on, geopolitical and economic ambitions mainly belong at European level.
A version of this article also appeared in the May 6, 2023 issue of the newspaper.